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CHOOSING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Nadia N. Sawicki*
Abstract: Modem principles of patient autonomy and health care consumerism are at
odds with medical malpractice law's traditional skepticism towards the defenses of
contractual waiver and assumption of risk. Many American courts follow a patient-protective
view, exemplified by the reasoning in the seminal Tunkl case, rejecting any attempts by
physicians to relieve themselves of liability on the grounds of a patient's agreement to
assume the risk of malpractice. However, where patients pursue unconventional treatments
that satisfy their personal preferences but that arguably fall outside the standard of care,
courts have good reason to be more receptive to such defenses. This Article fills an important
gap in the scholarly debate about whether patients and physicians should be able to modify
their default duties under tort law, demonstrating that two lines of rarely-acknowledged
cases-dealing with altemative therapies and Jehovah's Witness blood refusals-lend
support to the principle that patients who choose malpractice should be limited in their right
to tort recovery.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing debate about whether physicians and patients
ought to be able to contractually modify their default obligations under
tort law. One of the core issues in this debate is whether agreements
purporting to release physicians from liability for malpractice are
enforceable. Closely related is the issue of whether, in the absence of an
express waiver of liability, courts ought to recognize the defense of
implied assumption of risk in malpractice actions. Both inquiries speak
to the fundamental question of whether patients should retain a right of
recovery if they voluntarily choose to accept--either explicitly or
implicitly-the risks of negligent medical care.
Traditionalists view the doctor-patient relationship as fiduciary in
nature, and argue that releasing physicians from liability for malpractice
on the basis of a patient's voluntary choice should be prohibited as a
matter of policy because of the significant disparity in bargaining power
between doctor and patient.' Economists and others, however, argue that
allowing physicians and patients to shift the allocation of risk as they see
1. See infra section H.B.2.
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fit is necessary to achieve efficiencies that meaningfully benefit both
parties.2 Still other commentators fall somewhere between these two
extremes, arguing that physicians should be able to rely on contract- or
tort-based defenses grounded in a patient's voluntary acceptance of risk
only if certain conditions are satisfied.'
Much of the scholarship in this area either asserts or presumes that
American courts follow the traditionalist view and rejects any attempts
by physicians to relieve themselves of liability on the grounds of a
patient's agreement to assume the risk of malpractice. 4 But, as some
authors have recognized, the case law by no means establishes a
categorical prohibition. While most courts do ultimately reject defenses
based on contract or assumption of risk in medical malpractice cases, a
position exemplified by the widely cited Tunkl5 case, they often do so
only after carefully examining the characteristics of the patient's
acceptance-an adjudicative approach that is inconsistent with a
categorical bar.6 More importantly, there are a surprising number of
cases in which courts have allowed physicians to present such
defenses--cases involving experimental or alternative therapies, and
cases involving Jehovah's Witness patients who request surgery without
the use of blood or blood products.
Few authors meaningfully acknowledge these important lines of
precedent or consider their implications.7 Those who do cite these cases
2. See infra section I.C.
3. See infra note 89.
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the
ContractualFoundationfor Medical Services, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 205 (1986) (referring
to "courts' hostility towards all private contracts regulating the risk of medical injuries"); Leonard J.
Nelson III, Helling v. Carey Revisited: Physician Liability in the Age of Managed Care, 25
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775, 785 (2002) ("Traditionally, our courts have been unwilling to allow
contract law to displace tort law in cases involving iatrogenic injury. Tort law imposes certain
obligations notwithstanding agreements reached by the parties."); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 908 (1993) ("Tort law has largely eclipsed consent-contract
approaches to the problem of health-care-related injuries."); Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of
Medical Malpractice,97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1236 n. 191 (2012) (noting that "[c]ontracts purporting
to... reduce doctors' responsibility for malpractice are not enforceable: courts void such contracts
on public policy grounds").
5. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
6. Matthew J. B. Lawrence, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory
Agreement: Introducing Confidential Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-PatientRelationship
Problem, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 855-59 (2009) (noting that some cases analyzing exculpatory
agreements in the medical malpractice context engage in "case-by-case analysis" of "particular
bargaining dynamics" and specific contractual language).
7. Most articles citing these cases do so only tangentially, or in footnotes. But see Mark A. Hall,
Payingfor What You Get and Getting What You Pay for: Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven
Health Care, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 178-79 (2006) (discussing whether "patients'
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often refer to them as "exceptional" or "bizarre," dismissing them as
anomalies in an otherwise consistent doctrine barring limitations on
liability in malpractice actions. 8 Very few scholars have made serious
attempts to reconcile the outcomes of these cases with the traditionalist

model,

or to offer

doctrinal justifications

for courts'

more

accommodating attitude towards these defenses in some contexts. 9
This Article argues that it is a mistake to dismiss this line of cases as
mere footnotes in the jurisprudence, and that scholars should treat these
contractual and tort law defenses to medical malpractice liability
seriously. Rather, it is essential to understand why courts have been
receptive to the argument that patients can, in some contexts, be deemed
to have accepted the risk of harm arising from a physician's negligent
conduct. The outcomes in these cases more accurately reflect the
principles of patient autonomy upon which the modem doctrine of
informed consent is grounded, and so offer a valuable counterpoint to
the paternalistic and protectionist attitudes inherent in the traditionalist
model-a counterpoint that is particularly relevant in light of the modem
trend towards consumerism in American health care.
This Article analyzes the objections traditionally leveled against
attempts to limit patients' right of recovery in malpractice cases and
demonstrates why these objections carry less weight in the contexts of
experimental or alternative therapies and religiously directed treatment.
More importantly, it also demonstrates that the best justifications for
limiting patients' right to recovery in these narrow situations would also
apply to many other contexts in which patients pursue unorthodox
informed acceptance of substandard care is a liability defense," and recognizing "several lines of
doctrine" to this effect); Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, When PatientsSay No (to Save Money):
An Essay on the Tectonics of Health Law, 41 CONN.L. REV. 743, 762-64 (2008) (arguing that
waiver of liability and assumption of risk doctrines do not adequately protect physicians whose
patients seek out low-cost treatment and discussing Schneider v. Revici as an illustrative case);
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and
Health Care Providers, 51 U. PrrT. L. REV. 365 (1989) (analyzing the assumption of risk and
waiver cases discussed in this Article through the lens of fiduciary contracting).
8. See, e.g., Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 913, 942, 966 (2014) (describing Boyle v. Revici, Schneider v. Revici, and Colton v. New
York Hospital as "notable exception[s]" to courts' typical rejection of assumption of risk defenses
and contractual waivers in medical malpractice cases); Lawrence, supra note 6, at 875 (describing
Schneider v. Revici as "an otherwise strange exception to the categorical rule [barring waivers]");
Mehlman, supra note 7, at 411-12 (describing the decision in Schneider v. Revici as "bizarre" and
"perplexing").
9. One notable exception is Maxwell Mehlman, who skillfully analyzes the cases discussed in
section II.C through the lens of fiduciary contracting and concludes that their outcomes are justified
by the fact that the agreements in these cases satisfy the conditions for effective contractingfreedom of choice and adequacy of information. Mehlman, supra note 7, at 401-14.
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treatment that arguably falls outside the standard of care. Thus, contractand tort-based defenses based on a patient's voluntary acceptance of risk
should gain greater traction as patients with consumerist mindsets
increasingly seek out services that fall outside the medical mainstream
and that physicians may be unwilling to provide in the absence of
liability protection. These may include not only experimental and
alternative therapies and medical care guided by religious dictates, but
also services like adjusted vaccination schedules, low-cost or lowintensity care plans, requests for medically unnecessary tests and
treatments, as well as highly controversial interventions like elective
amputation and sexual orientation change efforts."°
The expansion of courts' reasoning in alternative therapy and
Jehovah's Witness cases to other types of patient-directed care is both
natural and necessary. American law permits patients to exercise their
autonomy interests by pursuing unorthodox medical treatments that are
freely available on the market--even treatments that fall outside the
standard of care. The common law of informed consent is grounded in
the principle that patients are able to comprehend and evaluate the risks
and benefits of their treatment options. It would seem consistent with
these foundational principles to limit a patient's ability to sue when she
makes a voluntary and informed choice to accept medical treatment that
constitutes malpractice, and her physician provides that treatment in
accordance with the patient's expectations. That said, expansion of
physicians' ability to rely on contract- and tort-based defenses in cases
of "malpractice by choice" must be mediated by additional patient
protections.
Part I of the Article briefly describes the development of modern
informed consent doctrine and the trend towards consumerist attitudes
and behaviors in the U.S. health care system, including the resulting
increase in patient requests for treatments that push the boundaries of
conventional medical practice. It draws a connection between the shift
away from medical paternalism towards patient autonomy, and legal
scholars' efforts to move the law in a similar direction by allowing
contractual modifications to physicians' default duties under tort law.
Part II explains how contractual waivers of liability and the tort
doctrine of assumption of risk might be used by health care providers to
limit liability in medical malpractice actions. It seeks to make a
significant contribution to the literature in this area by not only
providing an account of the traditional view rejecting these defenses, but
10. See infra section I.B.
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also comprehensively tracking and analyzing the cases in which courts
have been receptive to such defenses.
Part III seeks to reconcile the inconsistency between the strength of
courts' and commentators' objections to contractual- and tort-based
limitations on malpractice liability, and their apparent willingness to
dismiss these objections in alternative therapy and Jehovah's Witness
cases. It demonstrates that, although the judicial reasoning in these cases
is strikingly weak, there are in fact good reasons why courts would be
willing to limit patients' right to recovery in these two contexts.
However, this Part demonstrates that these reasons would apply equally
well to many other contexts in which patients knowingly seek out
unorthodox treatment that a jury might conclude falls outside the
standard of care, provided certain conditions are satisfied-namely, that
the patient is fully informed of the medical risks and benefits of the
selected treatment and its alternatives; the risks that ultimately arise are
those inherent in the treatment and not caused by unanticipated error;
and the legal fact finder concludes there is some societal value in this
unorthodox treatment.
Part IV concludes by addressing the concerns that might arise were
courts to extend their reasoning in alternative therapy and Jehovah's,
Witness cases to other contexts of consumer-directed care. First, it
demonstrates that a pure application of tort and contract law may be
inadequate to fully protect patients in light of the fiduciary duties owed
to them by physicians. Thus, it recommends that the use of assumption
of risk and contract-based defenses in cases of "malpractice by choice"
ought to be conditioned on the physician's satisfaction of his informed
consent duties (including his duty to disclose personal conflicts of
interest), and on his disclosure of the fact that the treatment the patient
has selected falls outside the medical standard of care. Second, this Part
recognizes the concern that, in the absence of malpractice liability,
physicians may have fewer incentives to practice within the standard of
care but demonstrates the limitations of this objection. It concludes that
there are alternative mechanisms by which the medical profession can
enforce quality standards that do not result in tort compensation for
patients who voluntarily choose to pursue non-standard medical
treatments with full knowledge of their risks.
I.

MOVING TOWARDS PATIENT AUTONOMY IN MEDICINE
AND LAW

In the second half of the twentieth century, paternalistic medical
practices gave way to a newfound appreciation for principles of patient
autonomy. Law and ethics both drove changes to medical practice,
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establishing a new duty on the part of physicians to obtain a patient's
informed consent before proceeding with treatment.
This increased emphasis on patient autonomy went hand-in-hand with
a new view of patients as active consumers of health care. As medicine
advanced and treatment options expanded, patients found themselves
able to make choices based on their personal values and preferences.1"
And while patients were previously dependent on their physicians for
information about medical conditions and treatment options, the internet
brought greater access to information and gave them the tools to selfdiagnose, learn about treatment options, and choose between providers. 2
Today, providers report an increase in patients actively seeking out
specific tests and treatments-whether branded pharmaceuticals
advertised on television, experimental or alternative therapies reported in
the media, or tests to confirm self-diagnoses based on internet research.
And some patients, in seeking out treatment consistent with their values
and beliefs, may request services that fall outside the medical
mainstream. Examples of such patient-requested care include
experimental treatment, complementary and alternative therapy,
modified vaccination schedules, treatment guided by religious beliefs,
and low-cost or low-intensity care. Some of these services are in fact
medically appropriate and supported by evidence but rarely available
due to liability concerns, 3 while others are so clearly beyond the
standard of care that they qualify as quackery.14
This shift towards a consumerist model of health care was also
reflected in legal debate. Scholars of law and economics argued that, just
11. The term "preference-sensitive care" is used to describe situations in which "two or more
medically acceptable options exist and choice should depend on patient preferences." John E.
Wennberg, Unwarranted Variations in Healthcare Delivery: Implications for Academic Medical
Centres, 325 BRITISH MED. J. 961, 962 (2002).
12. Of course, the quality of health information on the intemet varies widely, and patients are not
well-served by uncritical reliance on online resources. See generally Ahmad Risk & Carolyn
Petersen, Health Information on the Internet: Quality Issues and International Initiatives, 287
JAMA 2713 (2002).
13. One example is vaginal birth after cesarean (VBAC), a practice that the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists describes as safe and appropriate for many women with previous
cesarean deliveries. Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 115:
Vaginal Birth After Previous Cesarean Delivery, 116 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 450, 450
(2010). Nevertheless, many providers and institutions refuse to offer VBAC as a result of liability
concerns, among other reasons. Farah Diaz-Tello, When the Invisible Hand Wields a Scalpel:
Maternity Care in a Market Economy, 18 CUNY L. REv. 197, 210-13 (2015); Elizabeth Kukura,
Choice in Birth: PreservingAccess to VBAC, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 955, 967-70 (2009).

14. See, e.g., Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (upholding $4 million
jury verdict against a physician whose treatment for a patient with uterine cancer included six daily
coffee enemas).
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as autonomous patients might have varying preferences about health
care treatment, so too might they have varying preferences regarding
legal protection from medical malpractice.15 Rather than deferring to the
standard set of rights and duties traditionally set by tort law, these
scholars argued, both patients and physicians would be better served if
they were free to choose contractual terms that satisfied their
autonomous preferences.16
This Part briefly describes the historical development of the doctrine
of informed consent,17 explains how the principle of autonomy upon
which the doctrine is based went hand-in-hand with the trend towards
health care consumerism, and describes the challenges physicians face
when patients request care that falls outside the medical mainstream. It
then draws a connection between the increased recognition of patient
autonomy in medical decision-making and the push by legal scholars to
move the law in a similar direction by recognizing patients' right to
freely contract with their physicians.
A.

Informed Consent and Its Theoretical Underpinnings

Until the second half of the twentieth century, medicine was a
fundamentally paternalistic profession. 8 Driven by the ethical principles
of beneficence and non-maleficence, physicians diagnosed patients and
administered treatments with very little active participation by patients.' 9
It was not until the atrocities of Nazi physicians came to light at the
Nuremberg Trials of the late 1940s that public attention was drawn to
20
the need to protect patients from abuse by physicians.
American common law had long recognized that physicians may be
liable for battery if they performed treatment without a patient's
consent.21 But the 1950s and 1960s brought new developments in the
law's approach to patient rights. Courts began to recognize not only
physicians' basic duty to secure a patient's consent to medical treatment,
15. See infra section I.C.
16. See infra section I.C.
17. For a fuller account of the history of the legal and ethical doctrines of informed consent, see
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
18. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 20-21 (2002).

19. Timothy E. Quill & Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and Patient Autonomy:
Finding a Balance Between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
763, 763-64 (1996).
20. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supranote 17, at 87.

21. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905); Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp.,.
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
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but also a duty to ensure that the patient's consent was granted based on
full understanding of the risks and benefits of treatment.2 2 Thus, even if
a patient agreed to treatment and so could not bring a battery action, she
could bring a negligence action for the physician's failure to obtain
informed consent. These legal developments were driven in part by the
patients' rights movement, which emphasized the importance of
autonomy in medical decision-making. 23 Principles of medical ethics
also shifted to give greater weight to the medical profession's duty to
promote patient autonomy, rather than focusing on the traditional
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.2 4
The modem legal and ethical doctrines of informed consent establish
that patients have a right to be fully informed before consenting to many
forms of medical treatment. Physicians, therefore, have a duty to
disclose the risks and benefits of the treatment in question, the risks and
benefits of reasonable alternative treatments, and the risks and benefits
of taking no action. While these duties were originally established by
common law, many states now have statutes detailing physicians' duties
in this regard and establishing remedies for patients whose rights are
violated.

Today, some argue that the pendulum has swung too far in the
direction of patient autonomy, to the detriment of other important ethical
values.26 Others argue that the practical implementation of informed
consent doctrine is fundamentally flawed, and that providing patients
with information about treatment choices may not in fact serve their best

22. JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 44-46 (2d ed.
2001); FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 17, at 86-91; Jay Katz, Reflections on Informed Consent:
40 Years After Its Birth, 186 J.AM. COLL. SURGEONS 466, 467-68 (1998).
23. See BERG ET AL., supranote 22, at 18-24; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 17, at 91-98.
24. BERG ET AL., supra note 22, at 18-20.
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (2018) (requiring disclosure of (1)diagnosis; (2) the
proposed procedure's "nature and purpose"; (3) the material risks of "infection, allergic reaction,
severe loss of blood, loss or loss of function of any limb or organ, paralysis or partial paralysis,
paraplegia or quadriplegia, disfiguring scar, brain damage, cardiac arrest, or death"; (4) the
procedure's likelihood of success; (5) alternative treatments; (6) prognosis if the proposed treatment
is rejected); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2018) (requiring disclosure of
"alternatives" and "reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits"); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1303.504 (West 2018) (requiring "a description of a procedure" as well as disclosure of "risks and
alternatives"); TEX. CrV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.101, 74.104 (West 2018) (requiring
disclosure of the "risks or hazards" involved in a procedure).
26. See, e.g., Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical DecisionMaking: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85 (2010); Quill &
Brody, supra note 19, at 764.
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interests.27 But these concerns, however well-founded, have not
undermined the validity of the legal doctrine of informed consent, nor
the importance of autonomy as a fundamental principle of medical
ethics.
B.

Patients as Consumers

The phrase "health care consumerism" is used to describe a variety of
phenomena relating to patients' increasingly active role in their medical
care. For the purposes of this Article, however, the most relevant aspect
of health care consumerism is patients' desire to actively participate in
treatment decisions. This desire has led to patients independently
researching treatment options, requesting specific treatments that best
satisfy their personal preferences, and seeking out providers willing to
offer these treatments.
Sociologists in the 1970s first recognized the trend towards
consumerism in health care.2 8 Whereas the relationship between
physician and patient was traditionally a power relationship grounded in
deference to medical authority and expertise, patients' attitudes began to
change, "shift[ing] away from patient-as-supplicant to patient-asskeptic."2 9 Armed with newfound societal recognition of the value of
individual autonomy, patients became more willing to challenge
physicians' authority.3" Indeed, the changing language used to describe
27. See, e.g., JOE ALPER, ROUNDTABLE ON HEALTH LITERACY, BOARD ON POPULATION HEALTH
AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, AND INST. OF MED., INFORMED CONSENT AND HEALTH LITERACY:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2015) (discussing how low health literacy impacts the efficacy of the
informed consent process); Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making,92 WASH. L.
REV. 1255 (2017) (arguing that, compared to pure deference to patient autonomy, incorporating
"nudges" into the medical decision-making process leads to better patient decisions); Jay Katz,
Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 137, 139 (1977) (describing
the legal doctrine of informed consent as a "symbol" which "has had little impact on patients'
decision-making, either in legal theory or medical practice"); Marshall B. Kapp, PatientAutonomy
in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 LEG.
MED. 91, 99-101 (2007) (providing an overview of critiques of informed consent in action);
Schuck, supra note 4, at 903-04 (describing the gap between the ideals of informed consent
doctrine and its practical effect).
28. See, e.g., Marie R. Haug & Bebe Lavin, Public Challenge of Physician Authority, 17 MED.
CARE 844, 844 (1979); Leo G. Reeder, The Patient-Clientas a Consumer: Some Observations on
the ChangingProfessional-ClientRelationship, J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV.406, 406 (1972).
29. Clare Louise Stacey et al., Demanding Patientor Demanding Encounter?:A Case Study of a
Cancer Clinic, 69 SOC. SCI. & MED. 729, 730 (2009); see also Marie R. Haug & Bebe Lavin,
Practitioneror Patient-Who'sin Charge?,J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 212, 212 (1981) (describing
models of professional power in health care).
30. Haug & Lavin, Public Challenge of Physician Authority, supra note 28 (finding that
substantial proportions of patients are willing to challenge physician authority); Haug & Lavin,
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patients-now "consumers" of health care-reflected these changing
societal roles. 31 As Leo Reeder wrote in an influential 1972 article
describing the consumerist phenomenon in health care:
As a client[,] ...the individual delivers himself into the hands
of the professional-who presumably is the sole decision-maker
regarding the nature of the services to be delivered. On the other
hand, when the individual is viewed as a consumer, he is a
32
purchaser of services and tends to be guided by caveat emptor.
These changes were-and continue to be-facilitated by greater
public access to information about health and health care. Given that the
traditional power relationship between doctor and patient was justified in
part due to physicians' monopoly on medical knowledge, anything that
bridged this knowledge gap contributed to the weakening of physicians'
authority.33 From the "do-it-yourself health books" of the 1970s and
1980s," 4 to the internet boom of the 1990s and 2000s,35 to the rise of
direct to consumer drug advertising,36 patients have gradually developed
Practitioner or Patient-Who's in Charge?, supra note 29, at 212 (finding that substantial
proportions of both physicians and patients "express beliefs and report actions congruent with [a]
consumerist perspective"); Quill & Brody, supra note 19, at 764 ("The consumer movement has
taught patients to be more assertive, to question physicians' recommendations, and to demand
interventions that might otherwise be withheld.").
31. Reeder, supranote 28, at 408.
32. Id. at 409 (emphasis in original); see also Haug & Lavin, Practitioneror Patient-Who's in
Charge?, supra note 29, at 213 ("Caveat emptor, 'let the buyer beware,' rather than trust in the
seller's goodwill, characterizes the transaction.").
33. Haug & Lavin, Public Challenge of Physician Authority, supra note 28, at 846, 850 (finding
that health knowledge and education leads to attitudes challenging physician authority); Haug &
Lavin, Practitioneror Patient-Who's in Charge?, supra note 29, at 212 (noting that the power
relationship between doctor and patient is based in part on "the profession's monopoly on
knowledge not easily accessible to the public").
34. Haug & Lavin, Public Challenge of Physician Authority, supra note 28, at 844; Haug &
Lavin, Practitioneror Patient-Who'sin Charge?,supra note 29, at 213.
35. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, The Fiduciary Obligation ofPhysicians
to 'Just Say No' ifan 'Informed' Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 39
SETON HALL L. REv. 335, at 346-49 (2009) (discussing research about patient intemet use); Stacey
et al., supra note 29, at 731 (summarizing research about the challenges associated with internetinformed patients); id. at 734 (noting that "demanding" patient encounters "generally resulted when
patients used knowledge gleaned on the internet to push for particular treatments or therapies").
36. Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 35, at 352-61 (discussing impact of direct to
consumer advertising on patient requests and prescribing practices); Mark Peyrot et al., Direct-toConsumer Ads Can Influence Behavior, 18 MKTG. HEALTH SERVS. 27 (1998) (analyzing factors
associated with consumer prescription drug knowledge and requests); Mary Beth Pinto et al., The
Impact of PharmaceuticalDirect Advertising: Opportunitiesand Obstructions, 15 HEALTH MKTG.
Q. 89 (1998) (discussing benefits and drawbacks of direct to consumer advertising, including impact
on patients and providers); Stacey et al., supra note 29, at 730 ("'Patients" roles as consumers are
reinforced in several ways, including direct-to-consumer advertising by drug companies.").
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the ability to collect information and investigate medical options without
relying on physician expertise.
Changes in modem medicine also contributed to this trend. As new
treatments for common conditions developed, patients' options
expanded. Rather than being limited to a single viable treatment option,
today's patients are often offered a variety of approaches for managing
and treating their illnesses. How these patients choose to proceed often
has as much to do with their personal values and preferences-balancing
quality of life issues against the possibility of extending life, for
example-as with the clinical efficacy of the various treatment options.3 7
The practical result of these societal changes is that today's patients
are more assertive 38 in voicing their concerns and more persistent39 in
seeking out the care that satisfies their personal preferences. Rather than
deferring to physicians' recommendations, patients view the physicianpatient encounter as an opportunity for bargaining and negotiation."n
Research indicates that many patients enter the physician-patient
encounter with "specific expectations for care."41 For example, patients
may request prescription drugs that they learned about through direct-toconsumer advertising;4 2 ask for antibiotics in situations when they are
37. See generally Ronald M. Epstein & Ellen Peters, Beyond Information: Exploring Patients'
Preferences, 302 JAMA 195 (2009) (discussing how patients construct preferences when several
treatment options exist); Wennberg, supra note 11 (describing the phenomenon of preferencesensitive care).
38. Quill & Brody, supra note 19 ("The consumer movement has taught patients to be more
assertive, to question physicians' recommendations, and to demand interventions that might
otherwise be withheld.").
39. Drew Foster, 'Keep Complaining til Someone Listens': Exchanges of Tacit Healthcare
Knowledge in Online Illness Communities, 166 SOC. SCI. & MED. 25, 25 (2016) (finding that online
patient communities serve as forums in which patients can learn how to "receive their desired form
of care from the health system and to negotiate relationships with medical professionals and
institutions," and that these communities view persistence is a necessary strategy when seeking out
high-quality medical care).
40. Haug & Lavin, Practitioneror Patient-Who's in Charge?, supranote 29, at 213; Richard L.
Kravitz et al., Characterizing Patient Requests and Physician Responses in Office Practice, 37
HEALTH Svcs. RES. 215, 216 (2002); Reeder, supra note 28, at 409.
41. Stacey et al., supra note 29, at 732; see also Kravitz et al., infra note 45, at 1673 (finding that
23% of patients, in an observational study of patient visits to physicians, requested at least one test,
new prescription, or referral); cf B. Mitchell Peck et al., Do Unmet Expectationsfor Specific Tests,
Referrals, andNew Medications Reduce Patients' Satisfaction?, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1080,
1082, 1085 (2004) (finding that 56% of patients seeing their primary care providers have at least one
"expectation for a test, referral, or new medication," but that many of these expectations are
"vague").
42. Nicky Britten & Obioha Ukoumunne, The Influence of Patients' Hopes of Receiving a
Prescription on Doctors' Perceptions and the Decision to Prescribe, 315 BMJ: BRITISH MED. J.
7121 (1997) (finding, in a survey of over 500 patients waiting to see their general practitioners, that
67% hoped for a prescription); Benjamin Lewin, Patient Satisfaction with Physician Responses
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not appropriate,4 3 or request specific diagnostic tests or referrals. 4 When

their expectations are not met, patients are more likely to be dissatisfied
with their medical care.45 If they have the freedom to do so, patients may
choose to "shop around" to find providers who are willing to comply
with their requests.46

Perhaps not surprisingly, these consumerist trends have impacted
medical practice. One author described "fulfillment of patient

During Interactions Prompted by PharmaceuticalAdvertisements, 50 Soc. So. J. 491 (2013)
(finding that direct-to-consumer drug advertising shapes patients' expectations and leads patients to
mention or request specific drugs to their physicians). Many physicians have negative views of
patient demands for prescription medication, in part because they believe these demands are based
on incorrect information or unreasonable expectations. Peyrot et al., supra note 36, at 28 ("Often
physicians view advertising as a challenge to medical authority, and fear that patients will make
inappropriate drug requests."); id. at 94 ("Advertising that is intended to increase the demand for
drugs is also likely to increase the number of people making incorrect assumptions about the
appropriateness of these medications. When patients demand specific prescriptions, they may
collide with physicians more knowledgeable about the efficacy of the drug in question."); Woodie
M. Zachry III et al., Clinicians' Responses to Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
Medications, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1808, 1808 (2003) (finding that physicians are more
likely to become "annoyed' and "frustrated" when patients ask about medications they learned
about through direct-to-consumer drug advertising than through other sources of information).
43. Tanya Stivers, Participating in Decisions about Treatment: Overt Parent Pressure for
Antibiotic Medication in Pediatric Encounters, 54 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1111, 1111 (2002)
(summarizing research finding that pediatric physicians prescribe antibiotics as a result of parental
insistence, even when their appropriateness is questionable).
44. Kravitz et al., supra note 40, at 229; Richard L. Kravitz, MeasuringPatients' Expectations
and Requests, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 881, 884 (2001); Jerry Menikoff, Demanded Medical
Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1098 (1998).
45. See Robert A. Bell et al., Unmet Expectations for Care and the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 17 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 817, 820 (2002) (finding that patients who held unmet
expectations for care were less satisfied); Richard L. Kravitz et al., Direct Observation of Requests
for Clinical Services in Office Practice: What Do Patients Want and Do They Get It?, 163
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1673, 1678 (2003) (finding that patient satisfaction was significantly
decreased when a physician failed to fulfill an "action request" by a patient); Lewin, supra note 42
(finding that patients who mention a specific drug to their physicians and do not receive a
prescription for that drug are less likely to be satisfied). But see Peck, supra note 41, at 1080-81,
84-85 (discussing research related to patient expectations and satisfaction but ultimately finding
"little support for the relationship between fulfillment of specific expectations and patient
satisfaction").
46. Stacey et al., supra note 29, at 730; see also Kristin K. Barker, ElectronicSupport Groups,
Patient-Consumers, and Medicalization: The Case of Contested Illness, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 20, 20 (2008) (finding that participants "empower each other to search for physicians who
will recognize and treat their condition accordingly"); Haug & Lavin, Practitioneror PatientWho's in Charge?, supra note 29, at 214; Drug Advertising Prompts Patient Discussion with
Physicians, Study Shows, HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC MGMT., at 7 (Sept. 1, 1999) (describing doctor
shopping phenomenon); cf Haug & Lavin, Practitioneror Patient-Who 's in Charge?,supra note
29, at 233 (recognizing that some patients may not have the economic flexibility to change
providers).
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expectations" as "a major-if not the major-concern for clinicians." 47
Indeed, research indicates that when patients make requests or have
specific expectations, physicians are more likely to comply than when
patients don't have such expectations.4 8 A 2003 study, for example,
showed that physicians are more likely to provide a referral or new
prescription to a patient who makes such a request.4 9 A 1997 study found
that physicians are more likely to prescribe medications when they
believe that their patients expect a prescription,5 ° even if it is not
medically indicated.5"
When physicians express frustration with "difficult" or "demanding"
patients, they are often responding directly to patients' consumerist
attitudes and expectations.5 2 Some physicians now believe that their best
safeguard against patient dissatisfaction is offering patients a "cafeteria"

47. Peck, supra note 41, at 1080; see also Kravitz, supra note 44, at 881 (finding that meeting
patient expectations, and in turn, increasing patient satisfaction, is correlated with "a lower
propensity to sue for malpractice"); Zachry et al., supra note 42, at 1811 (noting that patient
expectations for drug treatment may place pressure on physicians to meet those expectations).
48. Kravitz et al., supra note 45, at 1680 ("It is perhaps unrealistic to expect that physicians will
refuse to provide clinical services to patients whose requests are sufficiently strident."); Kravitz,
supra note 44, at 881 ("By acceding to the patient's request, the physician avoided a confrontation
with the patient but left herself vulnerable to the disapproval of her colleagues.").
49. Kravitz et al., supra note 45.
50. Jill Cockbum & Sabrina Pit, Prescribing Behaviour in Clinical Practice: Patients'
Expectations and Doctors' Perceptions of Patients' Expectations, 315 BRITIS1t MED. J. 520, 520
(1997) (finding that patients who expected a prescription were almost three times more likely to
receive it than patients who came in without such expectations, and that physicians who thought
their patient had such expectations were ten times more likely to prescribe).
51. Britten & Ukoumunne, supra note 42, at 1506 (finding that 22% of prescriptions written were
"not strictly indicated on purely medical grounds"); Keerthi Gogineni et al., Patient Demands and
Requests for Cancer Tests and Treatments, 1 JAMA ONCOLOGY 33, 35-36 (2015) (identifying
"clinically inappropriate" patient requests as including requests for imaging studies, palliative
treatments, and laboratory tests); Quill & Brody, supra note 19 (noting that "[t]he consumer
movement has taught patients to... demand interventions that might otherwise be withheld");
Stivers, supra note 43, at 1127 (finding that parental pressure for antibiotics "can push physicians to
prescribe antibiotics even when their appropriateness is questionable").
52. Bell et al., supra note 45, at 820 (finding that "visits in which patients reported an unmet
expectation were perceived by physicians as being more demanding and less satisfying"); Kravitz et
al., supra note 45, at 1680 ("Physicians experienced visits in which patients requested diagnostic
tests as particularly demanding."); Kravitz, et al., supra note 40, at 217 (noting that patient requests
for diagnostic tests, medications, and referrals "may foment patient-physician discord or distrust if
not handled properly."); Stacey et al., supra note 29, at 729 (noting that "demanding" patient
encounters "tend to happen when patients directly or indirectly challenge physician judgment,
authority or jurisdiction," often as a result of consumerist tendencies or internet research); Zachry et
al., supra note 42 (finding that physicians are likely to become "annoyed" and "frustrated" when
patients ask about medications they learned about through direct-to-consumer drug advertising).
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of options from which to choose--even if that is at odds with their own
perceptions about best medical practice. 3
The fact that some patients' expectations and requests for care do not
align with best practices in medical care is particularly problematic. As
noted above, many physicians report that patients regularly request
unnecessary diagnostic tests and prescriptions-but providing these
services, while professionally questionable, is unlikely to cause most
patients significant harm. An unnecessary diagnostic test may result in a
false positive, causing a patient anxiety about a medical condition she
does not have; taking an unnecessary prescription may cause side effects
that she could otherwise have avoided-but as a general matter, the risk
of harm to patients from such accommodations is limited.54
That said, some patients seek out treatments that fall at the boundaries
of responsible medical practice despite the significant medical risks of
doing so. Section II.C. 1, for instance, describes lawsuits by cancer
patients who chose to forgo traditional treatments like chemotherapy and
radiation that could have saved their lives, and instead sought out
physicians offering alternative therapies that juries concluded were
outside the standard of care. Another example can be found in parents
skeptical of childhood vaccination, who often seek out "alternative
vaccine schedules" that put their children (and others) at risk of
56
infectious disease.55 Physicians often comply with these requests,

53. Quill & Brody, supra note 19, at 764 ("Many physicians feel that giving patients the full
range of choices and withholding their own recommendations are safeguards against lawsuits."); cf
Alan Meisel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal andEthical Myths about Informed Consent, 156 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2523 (1996) (challenging the myth that the legal doctrine of "informed
consent requires physicians to operate a medical cafeteria, in which they must set .out all the
therapeutic options and let patients choose, each according to his or her own appetite").
54. Note, however, that the provision of such unnecessary care may cause harms at societal level,
by contributing to the rising costs of health care and, in tum, insurance premiums and government
expenditures. Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent and Societal Stewardship, 45 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 41, at 43-44 (2017) (patient choices may also have significant public health consequences,
as in the case of non-vaccination); Wendy Netter Epstein, The Health Insurer Nudge, 91 S.CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract-3009823 [https://perma.cc/RL76-GJXC]; see
also Lisa A. Newman, ContralateralProphylactic Mastectomy: Is It a Reasonable Option?, 312
JAMA 895, 896 (2014) (considering whether medically unnecessary contralateral prophylactic
mastectomies are an "unjustified expense" in an era of scarce health care resources).
55. Paul A. Offit & Charlotte A. Moser, The Problem with Dr Bob's Alternative Vaccine
Schedule, 123 PEDIATRICS el 64, e164 (2009); see also Allison Kempe et al., Physician Response to
ParentalRequests to Spread out the Recommended Vaccine Schedule, 135 PEDIATRICS 666, 666
(2015) (finding that 93% of pediatricians and family physicians surveyed reported parents making
such requests in an average month); Vaccine Schedule: Altering the Schedule, CHILDREN'S HOSP.
PHILA., http://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-schedue/alteringthe-schedule [https://perma.cc/G2NA-7CJM] (noting that "some parents now feel they should
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despite the fact that these alternative approaches have been described by
experts as being based on "bad science." 57 Some authors believe that
doctors who allow their patients to negotiate childhood vaccination
"flirt[] with malpractice."5 8
Many other alternative and experimental therapies are risky not only
because they are sought out in lieu of traditional therapies with proven
success, but also because they pose significant independent risks of their
own. For example, a variety of alternative treatments of questionable
efficacy are marketed to parents of children with autism spectrum
disorder, many of whom choose to pursue complementary and
alternative therapies.5 9 While some of these alternative treatments pose
no safety risks,6" others can be quite harmful.6' Chelation therapy, for
example, was originally developed as a treatment for lead toxicity, and is
used to remove essential minerals from the bloodstream.6 2 However,
when used in children who do not have lead poisoning, chelation therapy
can lead to cognitive impairments and even fatalities; its use resulted in

approach the childhood immunization schedule in an a la carte manner, giving their children only
those vaccines that they feel are appropriate").
56. Kempe et al., supra note 55, at 669-70 (finding that 37% of pediatricians and family
physicians "often" or "always" agreed to delay vaccines at a parent's request, and 37% "sometimes"
agreed to do so).
57. Offit & Moser, supra note 55.
58. Jim Anderson, Are Immunization Schedules Negotiable?, CLINICAL ADVISOR (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://www.clinicaladvisor.com/the-waiting-room/are-immunization-schedules-negotiable/article/
448840/ [https://perma.ccfU98K-W6GL].
59. According to some studies, somewhere between 52% and 95% of parents of children with
autism now seek out complementary and alternative therapies. R. Scott Akins, Kathy Angkustsiri &
Robin L. Hansen, Complementary and Alternative Medicine in Autism: An Evidence-Based
Approach to Negotiating Safe and Efficacious Interventions with Families, 7 NEUROTHERAPEUTICS
307, 308 (2010).
60. Id. (citing music therapy, yoga, vitamins, dietary changes, essential fatty acids, amino acids,
craniosacral manipulation, acupuncture, massage, and others as examples of safe interventions with
unknown efficacy or no efficacy).
61. Id. (citing chelation therapy, antifungal agents, hyperbaric oxygen therapy, and immune
therapies as examples of interventions that are unsafe or whose safety is unknown, and whose use
should be discouraged); see also Alisa Opar, The Dangers of Snake-Oil Treatments for Autism,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 22 2016), https://www.theatlantic.comlhealth/archive/2016/09/fringe-therapiesspectrum/501023/ [https://perma.cc/42TN-CVFB] (describing various dangerous treatments sought
out by parents of children with autism, including chelation, hyperbaric oxygen therapy, ingestion of
chemicals, and others); Trine Tsouderos & Patricia Callahan, Risky Alternative Therapies for
Autism Have Little Basis in Science, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 22, 2009), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
lifestyles/health/chi-autism-treatments-nov22-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y9CM-JXZB].
62. Akins et al., supra note 59, at 312.
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three deaths between 2003 and 2005, and the FDA has recently issued a
warning about the use of chelation therapy for autism.63
Finally, some patients seek out treatments that have been clearly
rejected by the U.S. medical community as falling outside the standard
of care. Sexual orientation conversion therapy (SOCE), for example, is
viewed by the majority of health care providers as ineffective and
unethical, and its use has been challenged by most professional
regulatory bodies.64 Many states have recently passed legislation barring
health care providers from offering such therapy (at least to minors).6 5
And despite research demonstrating that many patients suffer significant
harms as a result of SOCE-ranging from loss of self-esteem to sexual
dysfunction to suicide 6 6 -patients continue to seek it out, resulting in
who believe that such therapy violates
ethical challenges for providers
67
professional standards.
Another, more striking example of a patient-requested service that has
been roundly rejected by the medical community is when patients
suffering from body dysmorphic disorder or apotemnophilia seek out
physicians willing to amputate healthy limbs. 68 Doctors abroad have

63. Id.; Autism: Beware of Potentially Dangerous Therapies and Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm394757.htm
[https://perma.cc/6ER2-DN9G].
64. See Douglas C. Haldeman, Gay Rights, Patient Rights: The Implications of Sexual
Orientation Conversion Therapy, 33 PROF'L PSYCHOL. 260, 260 (2002); Jon S. Lasser & Michael
C. Gottlieb, Treating PatientsDistressedRegarding Their Sexual Orientation: Clinical and Ethical
Alternatives, 35 PROF'L PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 194, 194 (2004); Michael Schroeder & Ariel
Shidlo, Ethical Issues in Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapies: An Empirical Study of
Consumers, 5 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 131, 131 (2008).

65. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding New Jersey ban on
conversion therapy); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding California
ban on conversion therapy for children); see also D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015) (prohibiting
mental health professionals from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts with minors); 405
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48/30 (2016) (same); H.B. 2307, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).
66. See Douglas C. Haldeman, Therapeutic Antidotes: Helping Gay and Bisexual Men Recover
from Conversion Therapies, 5 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 117, 117 (2002); Ariel Shidlo &
Michael Schroeder, Changing Sexual Orientation:A Consumer'sReport, 33 PROF'L PSYCHOL. 249,
at 254-55 (2002).
67. See Lasser & Gottleib, supra note 64; Haldeman, supra note 64; Schroeder & Shidlo, supra
note 64.
68. Annemarie Bridy, Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the Medico-Ethical Limits of SelfModification, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 148, 148 (2004); Aimee Louise Bryant, Consent, Autonomy,
and the Benefits of Healthy Limb Amputation: Examining the Legality of Surgically ManagingBody
Integrity Identity Disorder in New Zealand, 8 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 281, 281 (2011); Josephine
Johnston & Carl Elliott, Healthy Limb Amputation: Ethical and Legal Aspects, 2 CLINICAL MED.
431,431 (2002).
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been willing to perform such surgeries at a patient's request, 69 arguing
that it is both ethically appropriate and therapeutically valuable to
patients who would otherwise live with "a desire so obsessive that it
leads to thoughts of suicide." 7 But there is no indication that U.S.
physicians are willing to do so, in part because of professional
opposition to the practice,71 and in part because of the significant risk of
liability. 72
While some of these examples seem extreme, they are offered to
demonstrate the range of services that patient-consumers seek out from
the medical community. Medical services that are not universally
accepted as being within the standard of care fall on a broad spectrum,
ranging from services that are accepted by a substantial minority of
physicians (which, depending on a state's medical malpractice law, may
fall within the standard of care), to services that are supported by
evidence but are not customarily offered by physicians because of
liability concerns, 73 to services that clearly fall outside the scope of
responsible medical practice and are almost uniformly rejected.
When patients suffer injury as a result of these treatments and
ultimately seek recovery, the final decision about whether a treatment
falls outside the standard of care is typically made by a jury. To make
this determination, jurors certainly look to the testimony of expert
witnesses, but they also imbue their decisions with their own value
69. See Clare Dyer, Surgeon Amputated Healthy Limbs, 320 BMJ: BRITISH MED. J. 7231, 7231
(2000).
70. Johnston & Elliott, supra note 68, at 432; see also Bridy, supranote 68, at 153 ("The issue is
made particularly difficult by the conceptual chasm between people ... who in their best clinical
judgment believe that elective amputation can be therapeutically beneficial, and people.. . who
express an automatic but principled conviction that the surgery has no therapeutic value and
represents a per se violation of medical ethics." (emphasis added)).
71. See Jason Beckford-Ball, The Amputation of Healthy Limbs Is Not an Option, 9 BRITISH J.
NURSING 188, 188 (2000) (arguing that health care professionals should not "collude with people's
distorted body image" and "legitimize self-harm" by amputating healthy limbs); Randy Dotinga,
Out on a Limb, SALON (Aug. 29, 2000, 12:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2000/08/29/amputation/
[https://perma.cc/KE6N-Q5FE] (quoting medical ethicist Arthur Caplan describing medical
amputation of healthy limbs as a violation of the Hippocratic Oath and as "absolute, utter lunacy");
Johnston & Elliott, supra note 68 (concluding that ethical concerns stand in the way of professional
acceptance of healthy limb amputation).
72. Johnston & Elliott, supra note 68, at 432 (noting that "a court might consider a healthy limb
amputation... to be negligent because the procedure is not yet considered by a responsible body of
medical opinion to be an appropriate and effective treatment of a medical condition").
73. A well-recognized problem with the fact that the standard of care in medicine is defined by
professional custom is that the adoption of changes-even very beneficial ones-is slow. Evidence
may support a new treatment option, but physicians may be unwilling to adopt it iftheir colleagues
have not done so because without such widespread adoption a jury could not find that the new
treatment was customary within the community. See infra note 284.
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judgments-about whether the plaintiff or the defendant is more reliable,
about what they would want their own physicians to do, and about
whether injured plaintiffs are deserving of compensation at all. It is
possible that a jury may impose liability on a physician for conduct that
is generally accepted as being within the standard of care, simply due to
the testimony of a sympathetic plaintiff who has suffered serious
injuries.
"Value judgments, then, are inherent in the determination of virtually
any medical standard of care."74 As a result, it can be challenging for
physicians to predict where patient-requested care falls on the spectrum,
whether complying with a patient's request for unorthodox treatment or
denying it is more likely to subject them to malpractice liability. Thus,
physicians make value judgments here too, balancing the likelihood of
harm resulting from complying with a patient request with the likelihood
of patient dissatisfaction or harm from denying it. Given that it can be
difficult to predict whether a jury will view a physician's conduct as
falling within the standard of care, the preparation of defenses, like
assumption of risk and contractual waiver, becomes extremely
important.
C.

The Scholarly Debate: Contract,Tort, and FiduciaryPrinciples

The shift towards a consumerist and autonomy-based model of health
care significantly impacted the practice of medicine. However, these
changes also had implications beyond the realm of medical decisionmaking, prompting discussion in legal spheres about the common law's
treatment of patients seeking legal recovery for medical malpractice.7 5
Legal scholars highlighted a fundamental inconsistency between modem
informed consent law's conception of patients as autonomous agents,
and courts' ongoing reliance on a "vulnerable patient" narrative to
support policy arguments barring enforcement of contractual waivers of
liability.

76

74. Menikoff, supra note 44, at 1108.
75. Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 87,
126-27 (1976) (describing freedom of contract as "an outgrowth of the principle of personal
autonomy"); Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce
Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 349, 355 (1992) ("A contractual approach
to the patient-physician relationship is also suggested by... the movement to increase patient
autonomy.").
76. Epstein, supra note 75, at 127 (arguing that the view that patients are "incompetent to fend for

themselves" is inconsistent with the lengths the law goes to in ensuring that patients are wellinformed); see also Laakmann, supra note 8, at 933 (noting that court's "hostil[ity] to the defense of
implied assumption of risk.., subtly undermines the rationale behind the informed consent
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Scholars began to consider whether, just as patients are better served
by making autonomous health care choices rather than deferring to the
paternalistic choices of the medical profession, patients might likewise
be better served if they had the opportunity to contract with their
providers for terms that satisfy their preferences rather than be subject to
the default rights and duties set by tort law.
This conversation was driven primarily by scholars of law and
economics, who viewed contract law as a solution to the "medical
malpractice crisis" of the 1980s.77 They were responding to a legal
regime in which courts were resistant to enforcing contractual
modifications to health care providers' duties or patients' right to
recovery.7" The default liability rules set by tort law, these scholars
argued, were too favorable to plaintiffs and therefore encouraged high
malpractice payouts-leading to increased malpractice insurance
premiums, increased costs to patients, and physicians leaving the
practice of medicine.7 9 In their view, not only was the tort regime
unfavorable to defendant physicians, but it also imposed costs on
patients who might not want or need the protection of tort law.8 °
Changing the medical malpractice system, they argued, would be a
natural extension of recent changes in health care delivery and
financing."
doctrine, as it implies that patients are summarily incapable of making rational choices about
uncertain treatments"); Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks
Between Patientsand Providers,49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 193 (1986) ("[T]he assumption of
patient ignorance is at odds with the trend toward greater physician disclosure as a prerequisite of
informed consent, which is premised on a new appreciation of the value of patient autonomy and
responsibility in making choices about health care.").
77. A full issue of the 1986 volume of Law and Contemporary Problems was dedicated to
addressing this problem. 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1986).
78. See infra section II.B.
79. Epstein, supra note 75, at 87-89.
80. Much of the discussion surrounding contractual modifications to physicians' tort law duties
centered around the need for cost containment and the hypothetical "cost-conscious patient." See
Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal
Obstacles, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 149 (1986) [hereinafter Havighurst, PrivateReform of
Tort-Law Dogma] ("[I]f some consumers are demanding economy, a strong argument can be made
for allowing a provider's legal obligations to vary so that a less costly product can be delivered in
response to that demand."); Clark C. Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standardof Care, 49 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 275 (1986) [hereinafter Havighurst, Standard of Care] ("[C]onsumers
should not be deprived by law of their freedom to opt for fewer costly legal rights than the legal
monopoly seeks to confer upon them.").
81. Epstein, supra note 4, at 201 (arguing that the transformation of the health care delivery
system should provide guidance in the context of medical malpractice reform); Havighurst, Private
Reform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 143 ("[P]rivate reform in the area of medical
malpractice squares nicely both with recent developments in national health policy and with recent
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The primary argument made by this school was that it would be more
efficient if patients and providers could freely contract to set the terms of
their relationships and the consequences of non-performance, rather than
having standards of care and liability rules imposed upon them by the
tort law system. They argued that the traditional barriers to efficient
contracting-lack of choice82 and lack of information 83-were either
disappearing in the modem health care environment, or could be easily
overcome." 4 Scholars further supported this economic argument by
pointing to legal theory, arguing that the consensual relationship
between doctor and patient more closely resembles commercial
relationships governed by contract than the relationships between
strangers typically governed by tort law.85 The malpractice crisis, they
argued, was simply evidence of the fact that tort law is an imperfect fit
in this context.
The contractual terms that scholars believed should be negotiable
between doctor and patient included terms relating to allocation of costs,
size of recovery, arbitration, standards of care, no-fault compensation,
collateral sources, periodic payments, punitive damages, proof of breach,
and limitation of liability to gross negligence.86 Of these, the most

changes in the health care industry itself."); Robinson, supra note 76, at 180 (arguing that economic
changes in the health care industry should cause us to rethink malpractice liability rules); id. at 198
(arguing that courts' paternalistic attitude in barring contractual modifications to liability rules "is
out of touch with the reality of modern health care services").
82. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 144 (identifying "the
emergence of a competitive market for health services and new opportunities for informed
purchasing by consumers" as a reason to support health care contracting); Robinson, supra note 76,
at 186-87 (citing the prevalence of elective procedures and low-value care to support the argument
that patients seeking medical care have the opportunity for reasonable deliberation among various
options).
83. Epstein, supra note 4, at 202 (arguing that disclosure requirements could remedy the
information gap between doctor and patient); Robinson, supra note 76, at 188-93 (dismissing
arguments about patients' comparative lack of information as flawed).
84. Relatedly, some argued that concerns about barriers to efficient contracting are resolvable by
having sophisticated agents like employers or insurers (rather than patients) engaging in negotiation
of contract terms. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 210; William H. Ginsburg et al., Contractual
Revisions to Medical MalpracticeLiability, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 256 (1986); Havighurst,
PrivateReform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 168-69.
85. Epstein, supra note 4, at 211 (arguing that "there is nothing special, much less sacred, about
medical services that justifies exempting them from ordinary contracting processes"); Robinson,
supra note 76, at 182-83 (arguing that twentieth century efforts to professionalize medicine and
distinguish it from commercial practice fail to recognize that "the provider/patient relationship is
grounded in contract and most of the economic terms are set by the usual elements of contract
formation").
86. See Havighurst, PrivateReform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 161-62; Ginsburg et
al., supra note 84, at 258-63.
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challenging to defend were modifications of the customary standard of
care 87 and complete waivers of liability,8 8 both of which, according to
some, pushed the boundaries of unconscionability.
Modem scholars have challenged the full freedom-of-contract view,
and many have instead offered more nuanced approaches for ensuring
that both patients and physicians can effectively satisfy their preferences.
For example, some argue that applying pure contract principles in the
health care context fails to take into account the fiduciary basis of the
doctor-patient relationship, and that therefore contractual modifications
ought to be subject to a set of standards that takes these fiduciary duties
into account.89 Others argue that resorting to contract law is unnecessary
because tort law itself can provide a solution to the efficiency problems
described by law and economics scholars.9" For example, the tort
defense of assumption of risk-like contractual waivers of liability,
typically rejected by courts in medical malpractice cases--could serve91to
protect physicians while allowing patients to pursue their preferences.
The scholarly debate about whether tort, fiduciary, or contract
principles should govern medical liability continues to this day.
Nevertheless, American common law has not kept pace.92 As described
87. Epstein, supra note 75, at 103 (acknowledging that "the requirement of reasonable care, as
elaborated in traditional negligence cases, is a fair implication of the terms on which the [doctorpatient] relationship is premised"); Havighurst, Standard of Care, supra note 80, at 270 (suggesting
that courts may view agreements to modify the standard of care as violating public policy, but
offering drafting suggestions for avoiding charges of unconscionability).
88. See Havighurst, PrivateReform of Tort-Law Dogma, supranote 80, at 165 (noting that broad
exculpatory clauses might be "too much for most courts to handle").
89. Maxwell Mehlman, for example, has proposed a model of "fiduciary contracting" to be used
in the health care context, which would require proof that the conditions for efficient contractinginformation and choice-have been satisfied. See generally Mehlman, supra note 7; see also Mark
Hall, The Legal and HistoricalFoundations of Patients as Medical Consumers, 96 GEO. L.J. 583,
591-97 (2008) (noting that while health care law has "conventional contractual foundations," it also
deviates from traditional contract principles in ways that reflect the unique relationship between
health care provider and patient); Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 775 (noting that "fiduciary
principles strongly influence how contract principles apply to medical decisions"); Laakmann,
supra note 8, at 965-66 (arguing that in the medical context, "law should distinguish between nonnegotiable fiduciary duties and duties that may be contractually modified by the parties");
Mehlman, supra note 7, at 366-67 (criticizing the Chicago school for neglecting to consider
fiduciary aspects in their contracting arguments).
90. Jennifer Arlen, Private Contractual Alternatives to Malpractice Liability, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE US HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 245, 257 (2006) (arguing that contract law

solutions do not offer patients the same benefit as tort law); Patrick S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice
and the Contract/TortBoundary, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287, 287 (1986) (arguing that the
solution is to change tort law, not move to contract).
91. Nelson, supra note 4, at 791; see generally Laakmann, supranote 8.
92. Schuck, supra note 4, at 908 ("Tort law has largely eclipsed consent-contract approaches to
the problem of health-care-related injuries.").
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below, courts are still quite resistant to any attempt by providers to
minimize their liability on the basis of a patient's voluntary agreement,
or to modify the default rules of the doctor-patient relationship by way
93
of contractual agreement.
II.

COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO PHYSICIAN LIABILITY

As described above, the shift towards a consumerist model of health
care led some legal scholars to argue that, just as patient preferences
now drive treatment decisions, those preferences should also drive the
law's approach to recovery. Nevertheless, many courts continued to bar
the use of both contract- and tort-based defenses based on a patient's
decision to proceed with treatment under conditions agreed to with the
provider. Under common law, physicians are expected to prioritize the
interests of their patients and satisfy professional standards of care, and
courts are generally unwilling to allow physicians to defend themselves
in malpractice cases on the basis of a contractual agreement with the
patient. So, too, are courts generally hostile to the tort defense of
assumption of risk, which relieves a physician of liability if a patient
voluntarily (but non-contractually) chooses to encounter a known risk.
This Part explains how contractual waivers of liability and the tort
doctrine of assumption of risk can be used by health care providers to
limit liability in medical malpractice actions, and describes courts'
traditional resistance to the use of such defenses. It also provides a
comprehensive overview of the many cases in which courts have been
receptive to such defenses, setting the foundation for Part III's
discussion of how the use of these defenses could be expanded to a
broader variety of contexts.
A.

Contract and Tort Defenses Based on Voluntary Acceptance of
Risk

When a physician charged with malpractice wishes to defend himself
on the grounds of a patient's voluntary acceptance of risk, he may rely
on either contract- or tort-based defenses. If the patient has signed a
waiver, release of liability, or covenant not to sue, the defendant
physician may point to that contractual agreement in an attempt to bar
suit. If there has been no explicit contractual agreement to relieve the
physician from liability, the physician may be able to rely on the tort
doctrine of assumption of risk to bar or reduce recovery if he can prove
93. Id. at 911-12.
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that the patient voluntarily chose to encounter a known risk. Whether
grounded in contract or in tort, both defenses are premised on a patient's
voluntary choice to encounter a known risk.
1.

ContractualRelease of Liability

While tort law establishes a set of default principles defining general
duties of care, contract law is the mechanism by which parties entering
into an intentional relationship can define the scope of their duties more
narrowly or more broadly. A contract may even release one party from
the duty to exercise due care entirely,94 leaving the second party with no
remedy for some types of injuries. 5
Contractual provisions that prospectively limit future liability for
negligent conduct are strictly construed. 96 For such exculpatory clauses
to be enforceable, their language must clearly and unambiguously
describe the scope of the waiver of liability, such that the party waiving
his rights is able to understand the rights he is giving up. 97 Even if these
requirements are satisfied, however, a waiver may still be unenforceable
if it violates public policy or affects the public interest, 98 which is
99
particularly relevant in cases dealing with medical services.
A defendant sued for negligence can therefore raise, as a defense, the
plaintiffs contractual agreement to relieve him from liability for

94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.

2000) ("The essential element of a contractual limitation on liability is that each party agrees that
the defendant is under no obligation to protect the plaintiff and shall not be liable to the plaintiff for
the consequences of conduct that would otherwise be tortious.").
95. Such contractual provisions may be referred to as releases, waivers, covenants not to sue, or
exculpatory clauses, depending on whether the parties are contracting about an existing claim or
about future conduct. That said, there is widespread agreement that these terms are imprecise, often
overlap, and are frequently misused. See, e.g., 17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 275 (2017) (noting the
various terms used to describe contractual agreements to exempt one party from future liability to
another); WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 419 (Arthur L. Corbin ed.,

3d ed. 1919) ("The term waiver is one of those words of indefinite connotation in which our legal
literature abounds; like a cloak, it covers a multitude of sins."). For reasons of simplicity, this
Article will primarily use the term "waiver" to describe such prospective contractual waivers of
liability.
96. 17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 276; 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:21 (4th ed. 2017); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d.
97. 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 96, §§ 19:21, 19:25.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 8 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 96, §§ 19:22, 19:23; see also Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d

441 (Cal. 1963).
99. See infra section IB
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negligent conduct. If this contractual agreement is deemed to be
enforceable, the plaintiff's negligence claim will be dismissed.
2.

Express Assumption of Risk

Express assumption of risk is a tort law defense that overlaps
considerably with the contract defenses described above. 10 A plaintiff
expressly assumes a risk when she explicitly (verbally or in writing)
agrees to accept a known risk of harm arising from a defendant's
conduct.1" 1 Like contractual waiver, express assumption of risk is
commonly viewed as either an agreement to release the defendant from
an existing duty of care,10 2 or an agreement not to sue the defendant for
injuries resulting from negligent conduct. 10 3 It is treated as a form of
contract, and so is typically subject to the same requirements as the
contractual limitations on liability described above.'0 4 The consequence
of a finding of express assumption of risk is a complete bar on recovery
by the plaintiff. 5
3.

Implied Assumption ofRisk

Implied assumption of risk describes a scenario where a plaintiffs
conduct (rather than her explicit verbal or written agreement) indicates
that she is choosing to voluntarily encounter a known risk. In such cases,

100. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 233 (2d ed. 2016) ("Any assumption of risk in
its express form is a contract, and is thus subject to the laws of contract enforceability and
interpretation."). That said, some courts appear to draw a distinction between contractual waivers
and express assumption of risk, holding that express assumption of risk may be a viable defense
even if the contractual waiver the plaintiff signed was unenforceable. See, e.g., Poag v. Atkins, 806
N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (describing an exculpatory clause contained in a consent form as
invalid on policy grounds, but holding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
patient expressly assumed the risks of medical treatment when she signed the consent form);
Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that the covenant not to sue in a consent
form signed by the patient was unenforceable due to lack of precision, but that the consent form
constituted sufficient evidence to allow a jury to consider express assumption of risk as a defense).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2; DOBBS ET AL., supranote 100, § 232.
102. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 232.
103. Id. § 233.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 233.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 (also noting that
express assumption of risk survives the adoption of comparative negligence).
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the plaintiff's ability to recover in tort is limited, much in the same way
as if the plaintiff were found comparatively negligent. 106
Regrettably, many courts appear to struggle with the distinctions
between the two categories of implied assumption of risk described
below.1" 7 Commentators have described the doctrine of implied
10 8
assumption of risk as "superfluous and unnecessarily confusing,"
Nevertheless, this Article continues to use the language of implied
assumption of risk, in part because of the author's belief that this
categorization is valuable,' 9 and also because many of the judicial
opinions discussed herein rely on the traditional definitions and
categorizations of assumption of risk.
a.

Primary

Primary implied assumption of risk-a complete bar to recovery-is
best understood not as a defense, but rather as a failure of the plaintiffs
prima facie case for negligence. 1 0 When a defendant raises this
"defense," he typically argues that the plaintiff was injured not as a
result of a breach of duty by the defendant, but as a result of a risk
inherent in an activity the plaintiff voluntarily chose to participate in."'
106. Many jurisdictions have officially "merged" the implied assumption of risk defense into
comparative negligence. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 237. The Third Restatement of Torts has
abandoned the doctrine as well. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§ 2 cmt. i.
107. Dale L. Moore, Please Watch Your Language: The ChronicProblem of Assumption of Risk,
61 CATH. U. L. REv. 175, 184 (2011) ("[C]areless language pervades these opinions, revealing
either ignorance of or indifference to the analytical nuances particularly important in [precedential
cases].").
108. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 237.
109. For an excellent analysis of the value of these categorizations, see Kenneth W. Simons,
Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REv. 481 (2002).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 reporters' note cmtj;
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 237 ("[A] plaintiffs apparent consent is ...ample ground for
concluding that the defendant's duty is limited or that the defendant is simply not negligent at all.").
Some commentators describe primary implied assumption of risk cases as those in which the
plaintiff has failed to show a breach of duty on the part of the defendant; others have suggested that
primary implied assumption of risk can describe cases where a plaintiff's conduct effectively
relieves the defendant of the duty to protect a plaintiff from the inherent risks of an activity. 3 STEIN
ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 14:14 (3d ed. 1997) (in describing implied primary assumption
of risk, noting that "voluntarily entering into a relationship with the defendant, and being fully
aware that the defendant will not be responsible for protecting him or her from known future risks,
the plaintiff impliedly relieves the defendant of any duty and agrees to accept the consequences");
cf Moore, supra note 107, at 188-89 (noting that primary assumption of risk does not relieve a
defendant of a duty; rather, either the duty does not exist in the first place, or it was not breached).
111. Inherent risks are ones that "cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of
the activity." Beninati v. Black Rock City, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105, 109 (Ct. App. 2009) (affirming
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The most common cases of primary assumption of risk involve plaintiffs
who voluntarily choose to engage in inherently dangerous recreational
activities (like skiing or skydiving) and suffer injuries caused by the
risks inherent in those activities.
In the medical context, an example of primary implied assumption of
risk would be a patient whose physician prescribes a medication and
explains that its potential side effects include nausea and vomiting. If the
patient takes the medication with knowledge of its risks and ultimately
suffers nausea and vomiting, she can be described as having impliedly
assumed the risk of side effects from the medication." 2 Unless she can
demonstrate that her physician was negligent in prescribing the
medication or in describing its side effects, she will not be able to
recover damages if she suffers nausea or vomiting. In effect, the
physician's satisfaction of his legal duty to obtain informed consent
operates as a "defense" to any claim by the plaintiff that the physician
should be liable for her injuries.' 13
b.

Secondary

Secondary implied assumption of risk, in contrast, is a true defense,
raised after a plaintiff has made credible allegations of a defendant's
breach of duty. When a defendant raises this defense, he argues that
although the plaintiff may have been injured as a result of the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiffs recovery should be reduced
because he was aware4 of the defendant's negligence and voluntarily
11
chose to encounter it.
Proving secondary assumption of risk can be quite challenging
because it is uncommon to find a plaintiff who is fully aware of the risk
arising from a defendant's breach, but who nevertheless chooses to

summary judgment against promoters of the Burning Man festival when the plaintiff, an attendee,
sued for negligence when he suffered serious burns after falling into the burning remnants of the
Man). They generally do not include the risk of negligence by a defendant offering the activity, or
other "extraneous risks that can be avoided with reasonable care." DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100,
§ 237.
112. Moore, supra note 107, at 193-95; see also Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 903 (R.I. 2003)
(affirming trial court's decision to introduce a consent form into evidence to show that plaintiff
assumed the risks of certain injuries inherent in a surgical procedure, and that those injuries were
caused not by negligence but "because such injuries occurred as part of the normal risks of
undergoing this type of surgery").
113. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 431-32 (8th ed. 2013).
114. See infra section IV.A.3 for further discussion regarding the nuances of this definition and
the doctrinal uncertainty regarding what, precisely, the plaintiff must be aware of
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intentionally encounter that risk.115 In the medical context, notably,
many instances of malpractice are unpredictable and unanticipated; thus,
it would be difficult to prove that a plaintiff, in advance of proceeding
with a treatment, was aware that the treating physician was or would be
negligent. One example of a case in which this defense might be
successful would be if a patient freely consented to receiving treatment
from a physician who was quite obviously intoxicated. 16 A second
example-and one most relevant to the arguments raised in this
Article-would be if a physician recommended a treatment that was
outside the standard of care, and the patient nevertheless chose to pursue
that treatment after being fully informed of its risks." 7
B.

The TraditionalPatient-ProtectiveView

Many courts reject such contract- and tort-based defenses on
essentially paternalistic grounds. Indeed, the cases taking this view are
so prominent-and so well represented in law school casebooks-that
some commentators make the understandable mistake of believing that

115. In most cases, such a choice would be unreasonable, which is exactly why many view
secondary assumption of risk as simply another type of comparative negligence. See 3 STEIN ON
PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES, supra note 110, § 14:14 ("When the plaintiff unreasonably volunteers
or chooses to encounter a known risk, he or she is assuming the risk in the secondary sense. This
may result from plaintiffs voluntary acceptance of an unreasonable risk, or from failing to exercise
reasonable care to protect himself or herself after accepting a reasonable risk."). This author
believes, however, that treating secondary implied assumption of risk as equivalent to comparative
negligence is misguided. Comparative negligence requires proof that a plaintiff unreasonably failed
to take precautions against a foreseeable risk, and that this decision was the cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. While many instances of secondary assumption of risk also involve a plaintiffs
unreasonable acceptance of known risks, others may involve a perfectly reasonable decision to
accept a known risk in which the plaintiff has no opportunity to take precautions. Such situations
cannot be described as acts of comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff. See Simons, supra
note 109 (analyzing the merits of distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable assumptions
of risk).
116. See, e.g., Champs v. Stone, 58 N.E.2d 803, 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944) (holding that a patient
who consented to receiving injections from a physician whose "gross intoxication" was "apparent"
was either contributorily negligent or assumed the risk of negligent care).
117. Surprisingly, Dobbs views such a case as a "no breach" example of primary assumption of
risk. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 237 (describing an alternative therapy case as one where the
physician "undoubtedly owes his patient a duty of reasonable care," but breaches no duty when he
"administer[s] only the care to which the patient consented," and noting that "the physician would
violate the patient's rights if he administered a traditional treatment after agreeing not to"); id. at
§ 232 (describing a Jehovah's Witness case as one where "the physician owed the patient a duty of
care but in fact exercised the appropriate care under the circumstances," on the grounds that the
physician "would violate the patient's rights if he administered transfusions after agreeing not to do
so"). For an explanation of why this interpretation is problematic, see section Il.C.2.
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these cases represent the entirety of common law's treatment of this
issue.
The classic case rejecting contractual releases from liability in the
1 8 In
medical context is Tunkl v. Regents of University of California."
Tunkl, a patient seeking admission to a charitable research hospital was
asked, as a condition of admission, to sign a document purporting to
release the hospital from liability for the negligent acts of its
employees.119 The California Supreme Court held that because an
exculpatory agreement between a hospital and a patient affects the
public interest, it is unenforceable on policy grounds.12 ° The Court
carefully analyzed a variety of elements relevant to the question of
whether a contract affects the public interest,121 and found that the
hospital-patient contract clearly satisfies them. Courts in many
jurisdictions have relied upon the reasoning set forth in Tunkl to
conclude that health care providers, including physicians,12 2 cannot
contract their way out of liability for negligence.1 23 Where no contractual
release exists, and physician defendants instead rely on implied

118. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
119. Id. at 441.
120. Id. at 447.
121. A contract affecting the public interest, according to the Tunkl court, "exhibits some or all of
the following characteristics":
It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party
seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public,
which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at
least for any member coming within certain established standards. As a result of the essential
nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation
possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who
seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public
with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a
purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. Finally,
as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control
of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.
Id. at 445-46.
122. See, e.g., Belshaw v. Feinstein, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (Ct. App. 1968) (extending Tunkl's public
interest reasoning to contracts between patients and physicians).
123. See, e.g., Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 282
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981); Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1969); Cudnik v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. App. 1994); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d
308 (App. Div. 1990); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977); see also A. M. Swarthout,
Annotation, Validity and Construction of ContractExempting Hospitalor Doctorfrom Liabilityfor
Negligence to Patient,6 A.L.R. 3d 704 (1966) (noting that rulings as to the validity of exculpatory
contracts between hospitals or physicians and patients "indicate generally, but not uniformly, that
contracts of the kind mentioned are invalid").
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assumption of risk defenses, courts
likewise generally reject these
124
defenses on similar policy grounds.
Critics correctly note that courts that reject contractual and tort-based
defenses in medical malpractice cases "have not always provided a clear
basis for their objections."'' 2 5 Mehlman, for example, argues that there
has been "no consistency in the rationales offered by the courts, little
practical guidance for future cases, and no way to distinguish cases that
have invalidated such agreements as a matter of law from those that have
upheld them or permitted their validity to be decided by a jury.' 2 6
Others point out that even applying the clearly described Tunkl factors
does not necessarily support the outcomes in many medical malpractice
cases. 7 However, a careful analysis of case law demonstrates that the
objections raised to defenses based on a patient's voluntary acceptance
of risk fall into three general categories: those concerning the
unwaivable nature of the duties owed by physicians, concerns about
freedom of choice and disparities in bargaining power, and concerns
28
about informational disparities. 1
1.

Unwaivable Duties

Many courts, in rejecting these defenses in malpractice cases against
individual health care providers, conclude that the duty of health care
professionals to provide non-negligent medical care is one that simply
cannot be waived, whether by way of contract or by a patient's implicit

124. See, e.g., Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 567-68 (D.C. 1979) (holding that the trial
court erred in allowing the jury to consider assumption of risk, noting that assumption of risk
defenses have "rarely been sustained in actions involving professional negligence," for reasons
including the knowledge disparity between doctor and patient, and the "greater duty" owed by
physicians to patients); Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d. 874, 886-87 (Del. Super. Ct.
2005) (applying Tunkl factors and finding that "primary assumption of risk" is not applicable in
health care contexts because patients do not choose to be in need of medical care and because
healthcare regulations prohibit patients from permitting providers to exercise less than ordinary
care); Brady v. Urbas, 111 A.3d 1155 (Pa. 2015) (same).
125. Mehlman, supra note 75, at 357.
126. Mehlman, supra note 7, at 401.
127. Id. at 401-02; Mehlman, supra note 75, at 357 (noting that the Tunkl analysis "has been
criticized as unpersuasive, incomplete, and inoperative"); Robinson, supra note 76, at 184.
128. The discussion below expands on Max Mehlman's excellent analysis in Fiduciary
Contracting, in which he recognizes two of these categories-lack of choice and lack of
information-and argues that they justify the outcomes in cases like Schneider, Colton,
Porubiansky,and others. See generally Mehlman, supra note 7; see also Mehlman, supranote 75, at
357-59 (noting that the "latent explanation" courts offer for the outcomes in these cases is that
contracts between physicians and patients are inefficient due to unequal bargaining power,
incomplete information, and lack of meaningful alternatives).
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agreement. As stated by the Delaware Superior Court in Storm v. NSL
Rockland Place, LLC,' 29 given the "strict legal, ethical, and professional
standards that regulate the healthcare profession," there is "virtually no
scenario in which a patient can consent to allow a healthcare provider to
exercise less than 'ordinary care' in the provision of services." 130
Some courts ground this duty in state laws of professional licensure,
which grant health care providers licenses to practice on the condition
that they satisfy the professional standards of care. In Emory University
v. Porubiansky,'3 ' for example, the Georgia Supreme Court found that
the physician's duty to exercise reasonable care is "an affirmative
statutory duty imposed upon those who engage in professional
practice. '' 12 Courts in Tennessee, New York, and Washington have
offered similar justifications for rejecting defenses that would effectively
eliminate the physician's duty to satisfy the standard of care.133
Other courts note that the duty to exercise due care is established in
the common law of tort and reinforced by malpractice law, and therefore
cannot be relieved by any contractual or consent-based agreement. 3 4 In
129. 898 A.2d 874 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005).
130. Id. at 874. In Storm, the court rejected what it termed the "primary assumption of risk"
defense in a claim alleging substandard medical care. However, it held that the defendants could
raise the defense of "secondary assumption of risk" in its efforts to prove that the plaintiffs conduct
constituted contributory negligence. As explained in section II.A.3, however, the claim that a
plaintiff has consented to substandard care is more accurately defined as secondary, not primary
assumption of risk, so the court's choice of language is perplexing.
131. 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981).
132. Id. at 905.
133. See, e.g., Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310-11 (App. Div. 1990)
(noting that the state "carefully regulates the licensing of physicians and other health care
professionals and monitors such activities to prevent untoward consequences to the public from 'the
ministrations of incompetent, incapable, ignorant persons"'); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429,
432 (Tenn. 1977) ("We do not approve the procurement of a license to commit negligence in
professional practice."); Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 502, 219 P.2d 79, 90 (1950) (holding
that state licensing statutes, which are intended to protect patients from incompetent practitioners,
are "incompatible with putting the individual to the hazard of risking incompetence in the selection
of persons to treat him").
134. See, e.g., Storm, 898 A.2d at 874 (noting that the assumption of risk defense is incompatible
with state medical malpractice law and nursing home regulations); Spar v. Cha, 907 N.E.2d 974,
979 (Ind. 2009) ("The duty of a treating physician is ordinarily to deliver medical services that meet
the standard of ordinary care."); Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 311 (noting that "concern for the enforcement
of established minimum standards of professional care provides the underlying rationale for a cause
of action for malpractice in favor of those who have been subjected to substandard care"); Conrad- Hutsell v. Colturi, No. L-01-1227, 2002 WL 1290844, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 24, 2002)
(rejecting no-duty primary assumption of risk as a defense, holding that a patient's decision to
exceed the physician's recommendation regarding narcotic dosage does not relieve the physician of
a duty to monitor the patient for drug abuse, and finding that such an outcome would be "against
public policy and render[] meaningless a physician's statutory obligations to his patients"); Brady v.
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Schwartz v. Johnson,35 for example, a Maryland appellate court denied
a physician's attempt to raise assumption of risk as a defense, holding
that allowing this defense "would mean that [the patient] consented to
' It concluded
allow [the physician] to exercise less than ordinary care." 136
that a patient's consent to treatment cannot be used to "relieve the
'
physician of compliance with the applicable standard of care." 137
Other
courts have been even firmer in reaching this conclusion. The Fifth
Circuit in Kozan v. Comstock,'38 applying Louisiana law in a medical
malpractice case, concluded that "[t]he duty of due care is imposed by
law and is something over and above any contractual duty. Certainly, a
physician could not avoid liability for negligent conduct by having
contracted not to be liable for negligence. The duty is owed in all cases,
' 139
and a breach of this duty constitutes a tort.
Finally, other courts frame the physician's unwaivable duty as
effectively fiduciary in nature, grounded in professional ethics and the
unique power relationship between physician and patient.14 ° In Ash v.
New York University Dental Center,14 ' for example, a New York
appellate court rejected a contractual waiver of liability in a malpractice
case on public policy grounds. It noted that physicians owe "independent
obligations" to patients based on their special relationship, one that
"imposes upon the health care provider greater responsibilities than that
'
required in the ordinary commercial market place."142
Courts in many
contexts have described the doctor-patient relationship as being
Urbas, A.3d 1155, 1162 (Pa. 2015) ("There is no assumption-of-the-risk defense available to a
defendant physician which would vitiate his duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary
standard of care.").
135. 49 A.3d 359 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012).
136. Id. at 373.
137. Id.
138. 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
139. Id. at 845.
140. See, e.g., Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 568 (D.C. 1979) (holding that "the nature
of the doctor-patient relationship, which requires the patient to rely on the learning and judgment of
the doctors, often precludes a finding that the doctor owed no duty to the patient," and that "the
doctor generally owes a greater duty to his patient than the patient owes to himself'); Storm v. NSL
Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 884 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that given the "strict legal,
ethical, and professional standards that regulate the healthcare profession," there is "virtually no
scenario in which a patient can consent to allow a healthcare provider to exercise less than 'ordinary
care' in the provision of services"); Rosenthal v. Bologna, 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995)
(rejecting liability waiver between patient and home health service provider, citing the "State's
interest in the health and welfare of its citizens" and the "highly dependent (and thus unequal)
relationship between patient and health care provider").
141. 564 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1990).
142. Id. at 311.
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grounded in fiduciary principles, imposing additional duties on
physicians for the protection of patients from abuse of power.143
While, in reaching these conclusions, some courts reference the
experimental or alternative therapy cases described in section II.C as
exceptions to this general rule, they offer no satisfactory explanations for
why these exceptions are justifiable.14
2.

Freedom of Choice and Disparitiesin BargainingPower

Multiple factors cited in Tunkl to justify a public policy exception to
enforcement of liability waivers speak to the patient's lack of bargaining
power when seeking out medical treatment; many other courts have
raised similar concerns. As the California Supreme Court wrote in Tunkl,
patients seeking medical services are "in special need of the particular
skill of [a hospital's] staff and facilities," and the provision of these
services constitutes a "practical and crucial necessity" for patients. 4 5
Consequently, "[t]he would-be patient is in no position to reject the
proffered agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agreement
'
to find another hospital."146
Courts considering assumption of risk
defenses have raised similar concerns about the patient's lack of choice
in the matter of whether to seek medical care, noting that unlike in other
commercial transactions where assumption of risk may be used as a
valid defense, a patient has little choice in pursuing treatment-she does
so not "out of a desire to satisfy a personal preference," 147 but out of
medical necessity.
143. See Hall, supra note 89, at 593 (citing case law holding that "physicians owe fiduciary-like
duties to their patients"); Mehlman, supra note 7, at 388-90 (citing case law describing the
physician-patient relationship as fiduciary in nature).
144. Spar v. Cha, 907 N.E.2d 974, 982 n.2 (Ind. 2009) (identifying, in a footnote, alternative
therapy and Jehovah's Witness cases as "exceptional circumstance[s]" where assumption of risk can
apply because "the patient's express refusal ahead of time relieves the physician of this duty");
Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d 359, 371 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (citing cases of alternative
therapy and patients' refusal to follow physician recommendations as ones where assumption of risk
would be appropriate, but concluding that a patient will "almost never" voluntarily accept the risk
that a physician will negligently perform a procedure).
145. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441,447 (Cal. 1963).
146. Id.; see also Rosenthal v. Bologna, 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995) (rejecting
liability waiver between patient and home health service provider, citing the "highly dependent (and
thus unequal) relationship between patient and health care provider"); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental
Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (App. Div. 1990) (in rejecting a liability waiver, noting that the
inequality of bargaining power between patient and health care provider, where one party "must
either accept what is offered or be deprived of the advantages of the relation," creates a "substantial
opportunity for abuse").
147. Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 883-84 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005); cf id. at
886 (noting that the question of whether a patient had sufficient bargaining power when signing a
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Some courts, in pointing to the patient's lack of bargaining power,
also reference the potentially discriminatory and disparate impact that
acceptance of such defenses might have on patients with limited
resources. If physicians were permitted to rely on these defenses under
ordinary circumstances, surely patients of financial means would attempt
to negotiate to retain their right to sue for malpractice. Patients who lack
the financial resources to negotiate with their providers, however, would
find themselves without a remedy. As the court in Tunkl wrote, "[t]o
immunize the hospital from negligence as to the charitable patient
because he does not pay would be as abhorrent to medical ethics as it is
to legal principle."' 48 A later New York case, also dealing with a health
care institution that served low-income clients, raised similar
concerns.' 49 The New York court noted that patients who receive
services at low-income dental clinics out of financial necessity "cannot
be considered to have freely bargained for a sub-standard level of care in
exchange for a financial savings."' 5 ° Upholding exculpatory clauses, the
court held, would lead to an "invidious result"--"a de facto system in
which the medical services received by the less affluent are permitted to
be governed by lesser minimal standards of care and skill than that
received by other segments of society."''
3.

InformationDisparity

Finally, many courts rejecting assumption of risk defenses in
malpractice cases do so on the basis that assumption of risk requires a
patient's knowing appreciation of risk, and that the information disparity
between doctor and patient necessarily makes this impossible.' 52 As

contractual exculpatory agreement is "not applicable in assessing whether a primary assumption of
the risk defense violates public policy").
148. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 448.
149. Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
150. Id. at 371-72.
151. Id. at 370.
152. See, e.g., Storm, 898 A.2d at 884 (holding that the information disparity between doctor and
patient precludes the use of assumption of risk as a defense, citing courts in other jurisdictions using
similar reasoning); Spar v. Cha, 907 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 2009) (citing Storm and Morrison to this
effect); Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d 359, 372 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (holding that "the very
nature of actions involving medical malpractice," in which there is a significant disparity in
knowledge between doctor and patient, precludes the use of assumption of risk as a defense); see
also Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974, 980 (D.C. 2003) (in ruling on a statute of limitations issue,
holding that due to the information disparity between doctor and patient, "patient can not be
expected to know that the doctor's actions might be negligent and result in harm or to question
them").
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noted in Morrison v. MacNamara,153 a case reversing a trial court's
decision to allow the jury to consider assumption of risk as a defense to
medical malpractice, "the disparity in knowledge between professionals
and their clientele generally precludes recipients of professional services
15 4
from knowing whether a professional's conduct is in fact negligent."
In cases dealing with contractual defenses, in contrast, there is no
requirement that a patient knowingly enter into a relationship that will
involve negligent conduct. However, because understanding of the
bargain struck is a necessary component of any enforceable exculpatory
clause, some contractual waivers in the health care context have been
struck down due to lack of clarity as to the terms of the agreement. 5 '
Such cases likewise reflect courts' concerns about patients' lack of
information as compared to their health care providers, albeit here, legal
information rather than medical information.
C.

Cases Limiting PhysicianLiability

Despite the vigor with which many courts reject the notion that a
patient may be deemed to have consented to negligent medical care,
there are a few contexts in which courts have been willing to accept
defenses based on a patient's voluntary acceptance of risk. For the
purposes of this Article, the two most relevant contexts involve
experimental or alternative therapies, and surgical treatment constrained
15 6
by Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs regarding the use of blood products.
153. 407 A.2d 555, 567 (D.C. 1979).
154. Id.; see also Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 761 ("If courts rigorously apply informedconsent law to assumption of risk, '[o]nly in rare circumstances would a patient be considered to
have assumed the risk of negligent medical treatment' because 'most patients' knowledge of
medicine does not permit them to understand these risks." (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy,
infra note 156, at 162)).
155. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., Coll. of Dentistry, 494 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724
(App. Div. 1985) (rejecting an exculpatory clause on the grounds that the contractual language did
not "unmistakenly express an intention on the part of the plaintiff to absolve the defendant of
liability for its own negligence"); Leidy v. Deseret Enters., Inc., 381 A.2d 164, 169 (Pa. 1977)
(noting that plaintiff who suffered injury at a health spa should be able to present evidence as to
whether she was "aware" that the exculpatory clause she signed would release the spa and its
employees (including physicians and physical therapists) from liability); Poag v. Atkins, 806
N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) (unpublished table decision)
(rejecting exculpatory agreement in a medical malpractice case because "no separate heading or
caption was present to alert the decedent that she was foregoing the right to bring suit").
156. Similar defenses have also been raised by physician-defendants where a patient fails to
follow medical advice, refuses recommended treatment, or makes misrepresentations that affect her
medical care. See Sharon W. Murphy, ContributoryNegligence in Medical Malpractice:Are the
Standards Changing to Reflect Society's Growing Health Care Consumerism?, 17 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 151, 167-72 (1991). These cases-in which a patient's unreasonable conduct or lack of due
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In the alternative therapy cases, patients argue that their health care
providers deviated from the standard of care in offering the treatment in
question-that is, even if the treatment was performed as intended, it fell
outside the standard of care. Physicians in these cases defend themselves
on the grounds that their patients freely and knowingly consented to an
inherently risky treatment. In the Jehovah's Witness cases, in contrast,
patients typically allege that some unanticipated negligence occurred
during the performance of surgery. The patients in these cases have
previously consented to receiving surgical treatment without the use of
blood or blood products, and their physicians claim that this consent
relieves them of liability for injuries resulting from blood loss, even if
that blood loss was occasioned by the physician's unanticipated
negligence.157
In both contexts, courts have been receptive to physicians' defensive
arguments grounded in the patient's implied or express acceptance of
risk. However, the reasoning offered by courts in these cases is often
quite underdeveloped. While some offer justifications for why
physicians should not be liable for deviating from the standard of care in
these contexts, many courts fail to acknowledge the patient-protective
arguments described above in section II.B, and therefore fail to explain
why these contexts justify a deviation from those traditional principles.
1.

Experimental or Alternative Therapies

The first line of medical malpractice cases in which courts are willing
to enforce waivers of liability and recognize assumption of risk as a
defense involves experimental or alternative treatments. In such cases, a
patient is offered the opportunity to receive a risky experimental or
alternative therapy and chooses to proceed with full knowledge of the
treatment's risks, benefits, and alternatives.158 When the patient later
sues the physician for malpractice, the physician may be permitted to
defend herself on the grounds of the patient's contractual waiver of

care contributed to her injury-are most often analyzed under the doctrine of comparative
negligence, rather than assumption of risk. Id. There appears to be little, if any, concern that
reduction of damages in these contexts is inappropriate. Moreover, they are distinguishable from the
alternative therapy and Jehovah's Witness contexts because they do not involve patients who
voluntarily and knowingly agree to pursue potentially negligent treatment freely offered by
physicians-rather, the patient's unreasonable conduct in the comparative negligence cases is at
odds with the physicians' expectations or recommendations regarding treatment.
157. See infra section II.C.2.
158. But see infra note 163.
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liability or implied assumption of risk.159 Typically, in these cases, there
is no allegation that the physician performed a treatment negligently.
Rather, the allegation is that the physician's selection and
recommendation of the treatment was negligent-in other words, that
the treatment itself was so far outside the standard of care that it would
constitute malpractice even if performed as intended. 16 0
For example, a series of New York cases involved patients suffering
from cancer who sought treatment from physicians offering alternatives
to radiation and chemotherapy.'6 1 Some of the physicians informed their
patients that the treatments were experimental, or not guaranteed to be
effective. 162 However, others did not disclose the experimental nature of
the treatments, or claimed unreasonable success rates. 163 Nevertheless, in
all four cases, courts allowed the defendant physicians to argue that their
patients' recovery should be reduced or barred entirely because they
voluntarily assumed the risk of treatment with full knowledge of its risks
and benefits.' 64 In two of these cases, where the patients had signed

159. See generally LUCINDA JESSON & STACEY TovINo, COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE
MEDICINE AND THE LAW 152-56 (2010) (discussing the assumption of risk defense in the context of
alternative medicine).
160. See, e.g., Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting that a
treatment described as "'non-conventional' may well necessitate a finding that the doctor who
practices such medicine deviates from 'accepted' medical standards"); Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 414
N.Y.S.2d 866, 876 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (describing the experimental treatment in question as one that
"because of its inherent dangers, may ordinarily be in and of itself a departure from customary and
accepted practice (and thus possibly actionable as malpractice) even if performed in a non-negligent
manner").
161. Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992); Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.
1987); Charell v. Gonzalez, 673 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Div. 1998); Poag v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448,
2005 WL 2219689 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) (unpublished table decision).
162. Boyle, 961 F.2d at 1062 (the patient was informed that the medications used were not FDA
approved, and that the physician "could offer no guarantees"); Schneider, 817 F.2d at 989 (the
consent form stated the patient's understanding that "some of the treatment procedures and
medications are still investigatory awaiting further research and submission for F.D.A. approval").
163. In Charell, the patient also brought suit for lack of informed consent, claiming the physician
told her that his treatment had a 75% success rate and failed to provide her with information about
the risks of treatment. Nevertheless, the court found that while there was evidence to support a
finding of lack of informed consent, there was also evidence to support a finding that the patient had
sufficient knowledge of the risks of treatment from sources other than her physician, and so could
be found to have impliedly assumed the risk of treatment. Charell,660 N.Y.S.2d at 665. In Poag,
the physician allegedly told the patient that the alternative treatment could "definitely cure" her
breast cancer; the court nevertheless concluded that there was a triable issue of fact as to what risks
the plaintiff was actually informed of and whether she impliedly assumed these risks. Poag, 806
N.Y.S.2d, 2005 WL 2219689, at *1, *3.
164. Boyle, 961 F.2d at 1061-62 (reversing trial court's rejection of jury instructions on express
assumption of risk, despite the absence of a signed consent form); Schneider, 817 F.2d at 996
(reversing trial court's rejection ofjury instructions on express assumption of risk, finding that there
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consent forms purporting to release their physicians from liability, the
courts held that the contractual waivers were unenforceable, but
nevertheless allowed the juries to consider express assumption of risk as
165
a defense.
Surprisingly, some of the opinions upholding assumption of risk and
contractual waivers as defenses in alternative therapy cases do not
acknowledge that courts have traditionally rejected these defenses in
medical malpractice contexts. 16 6 And as compared to the many cases in
which assumption of risk and waiver defenses have been rejected after
extensive analysis of policy arguments, the reasoning in these opinions
seems quite underdeveloped. Courts that support express or implied
assumption of risk defenses in experimental or alternative therapy cases
justify their holdings quite simply by pointing to the societal value of
allowing informed patients to pursue innovative treatments that fall
outside the standard of care. However, these courts offer no clear
guidance as to where one might draw the line between permissible and
impermissible deviations from the standard of care.
Colton v. New York Hospital 67 is one example of a case where the
court justified its holding by reference to the societal value of the
treatment in question. In Colton, two patients were injured as a result of
an experimental kidney transplant procedure that the court described as
being so inherently dangerous that it might "ordinarily be in and of itself
a departure from customary and accepted practice (and thus possibly
was sufficient evidence to present the issue to the jury; but upholding court's refusal to submit
consent form to the jury on the grounds that the form was not an unequivocal release of liability);
Charell,673 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87 (refusing to vacate jury finding that patient impliedly assumed the
risk of treatment); Poag, 806 N.Y.S.2d, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (denying motions for summary
judgment so that express assumption of risk defense, based on patient's signature on informed
consent form, could be presented at trial; but finding that the exculpatory agreement in the consent
form signed by the patient was unenforceable as violating public policy).
165. In Schneider, this outcome was understandable-the court found that the consent form
signed by the patient did not unequivocally release the doctor from liability and so was not
enforceable as a matter of contract, but that it could be used as evidence to support the assertion that
the patient voluntarily, knowingly, and explicitly assumed the risk of treatment. Schneider, 817 F.2d
at 993, 996. In Poag, however, the court's conclusion is somewhat perplexing-it denied the
physician's contractual defense on the grounds that releases from medical malpractice are against
public policy, but nevertheless permitted the defendants to make the same argument as a matter of
tort law via the doctrine of express assumption of risk. Poag, 806 N.Y.S.2d, 2005 WL 2219689, at
*3.It is unclear why, if barring a patient's right to sue for medical malpractice violates public policy
when the patient signs a document to that effect, those same policy reasons would not cause the
court to reject express assumption of risk (also a total bar on recovery) as a defense.
166. But see Poag, 806 N.Y.S.2d, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (refusing to enforce exculpatory
clause in a consent document on the grounds that policy reasons "typically" bar enforcement of such
contractual agreements, but allowing express assumption of risk to be presented as a defense).
167. 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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actionable as malpractice) even if performed in a nonnegligent
' Nevertheless, the court held that when a patient
manner."168
voluntarily
undergoes a risky procedure, the parties may covenant to release the
physician from liability for proper performance of that procedure.1 69 It
justified its conclusion by pointing to "public policy encouraging such
necessary activity as experimental medical research,"' 70 and noted that
this policy goal could not be achieved if patients were permitted to sue.
It did not, however, address whether other policy goals might likewise
be achieved by enforcing covenants not to sue in other medical contexts.
And perhaps most strikingly, although the court cited Tunkl in its
discussion of legal terminology, 171 nowhere did it acknowledge the
primary holding of the Tunkl decision or the implications of that
decision-namely, that releases of liability for negligence by health care
institutions and providers generally violate public policy.
The court in Schneider v. Revici 172 relied on similar reasoning when it
allowed a jury to consider express assumption of risk in a case where a
patient with breast cancer sought out non-invasive therapy that had not
been adopted by the medical community. 173 As in Colton, the allegations
of malpractice in Schneider related to the provision of the alternative
treatment itself-not any negligence in the administration or
performance of that treatment. The court held that an informed decision
to reject conventional cancer therapy and seek out alternative treatments
is within the patient's right "to determine what shall be done with his
own body," but offered no guidance as to whether there are any contexts
in which this right of self-determination might justifiably be limited.' 74
Unlike the court in Colton, it acknowledged the plaintiffs argument that
public policy generally opposes the use of assumption of risk to
"dissolve the physician's duty to treat a patient. according to medical
community standards," but quickly dismissed that argument by pointing

168. Id. at 876.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 875 (The court specifically referenced New York legislation favoring kidney transplant
programs, and federal and state subsidies of kidney transplants and experimental medical research
programs. Note, however, that the kidney transplant at issue in this case was being provided for the
purposes of clinical treatment, and not for research purposes).
171. Id. at 964 (citing Tunkl in its discussion of the distinctions between waivers, releases,
covenants not to sue, and exculpatory clauses).
172. 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987).
173. Id. at 995.
174. Id.
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out that no such public policy had been statutorily enacted.' 75 The court
ultimately concluded that there is no policy reason to prevent a patient
from "go[ing] outside currently approved medical methods" in pursuit of
176
treatment.
In Charell v. Gonzalez, 177 the court recognized the defendant's
argument that the practice of alternative medicine would be chilled if the
verdict against the physician were upheld. 178 Unlike the court in
Schneider, the Charell court did not explicitly opine on the value of
alternative and experimental treatments such as the ones offered by the
defendants. However, it seemed to acknowledge that refusing to
recognize assumption of risk and waiver defenses would chill these
practices, noting that the only way physicians could offer such a "nonconventional" therapy is if their patient "execute[d] a comprehensive
consent containing appropriate information as to the risks involved" that
could then be relied upon as proof of the patient's voluntary acceptance
of specific risks. 179 Like the court in Colton, it did not mention the
traditional public policy objections to the enforcement of contractual
waivers or the use of assumption of risk defenses in medical malpractice
cases, and offered no indication of whether these defenses could be used
beyond the context of alternative or experimental cancer treatment.
In sum, the courts that have accepted claims that patients' recovery
for malpractice should be barred or limited if they knowingly chose to
pursue risky experimental or alternative therapy have justified their
decisions for reasons of public policy. They conclude that because there
is value in medical experimentation, and because patients have the right
to make medical decisions about their bodies, a patient's agreement to
pursue unconventional treatment can and should be viewed either as a
decision to release the physician from the duty to provide standard
medical care (barring recovery entirely) or as a justifiable reason to
reduce recovery. These courts do not, however, explain why these policy
arguments override the argument that the duties of care imposed on
physicians by statute, common law, and professional ethics are

175. Id. (noting that under New York common law, waivers of liability do not violate public
policy unless there are statutory limitations on such agreements (citing Arbegast v. Bd. of Educ., 65
N.Y.2d 161, 170 (1985))).
176. Schneider, 817 F.2d at 995; see also Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992) (relying
on the reasoning in Schneider).
177.
178.
179.
patient

660 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
Id. at 668.
Id. Interestingly, Charell was one of the cases in which the physician failed to inform the
of the risks of treatment. See supranote 163.
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fundamentally unwaivable. 18 ° Moreover, these
question of whether there are other contexts,
alternative therapy, in which public policy
autonomous decisions to pursue treatment that
of care.
2.

cases do not resolve the
beyond experimental or
might support patients'
falls outside the standard

Jehovah's Witness Refusal of Blood

The second category of malpractice cases in which courts regularly
permit the use of voluntary acceptance of risk defenses involves
Jehovah's Witness patients whose religious beliefs prohibit the use of
blood or blood products. Typically, these cases arise when a physician's
negligent performance of a surgical operation results in an injury that is
exacerbated by the patient's refusal to accept transfused blood. Most
courts in these cases hold that while patients who refuse blood for
religious reasons do not assume the risk of the physician's negligence,
they do assume the risk of harm resulting from refusal to accept blood.'81
The strongest policy justification that has been offered in support of
this conclusion is that, in the absence of such liability protections,
physicians would be unwilling to accept and treat Jehovah's Witness
patients.' 82 In Shorter v. Drury,'83 the court described such an outcome
as "repugnant in a society which attempts to make medical care
available to all its members."' 84 That said, many courts adjudicating
Jehovah's Witness cases permit defendants to present contractual or tortbased defenses based on the patient's voluntary acceptance of risk
without considering policy justifications at all. Rather, they simply
analyze these defenses as they would in any other tort action-by
looking to whether the language in a signed release was specific
enough,' 85 or referencing state constitutional provisions requiring jury

180. See supra section II.B.
1.
181. See cases cited infra, note 194. But see Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1251
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that signed release barred patient's claim against the hospital for
injuries resulting from implantation of a defective heart valve).
182. Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 652-53, 695 P.2d 116, 120-21 (1985).
183, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116 (1985).
184. Id. at 652, 695 P.2d at 121.
185. See, e.g., Garcia, 613 N.E.2d at 1251 (holding that release signed by Jehovah's Witness
patient barred suit as a matter of law, finding that there were no policy reasons to bar enforcement
of the release, which "explicitly delineated the desires and intentions of both parties"); Corlett v.
Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257 (11. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that release signed by Jehovah's Witness
patient did not bar malpractice suit, because the language of the release did not specifically relieve
physician from liability for negligence in diagnosis and treatment).
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determinations of assumption of risk. 8 6 As with many of the
experimental and alternative treatment cases, courts in blood refusal
cases rarely acknowledge the traditional bar on assumption of risk and
contractual waiver in medical malpractice cases, and offer little to no
justification for their deviation from these traditional principles.187 In
Garcia v. EdgewaterHospital,188 for example, the court recognized that
"exculpatory contracts are not favored" and will not be enforced if they
are "against public policy," but ultimately concluded, without further
analysis, that "there are no policy reasons which would indicate that the
releases [signed by the Jehovah's Witness plaintiff] should not be
upheld."18' 9
However, there are two peculiarities in these cases that distinguish
them from the experimental and alternative therapy cases described
above. First, unlike the experimental treatment cases, the plaintiffs in
blood refusal cases are not explicitly alleging that surgery without the
use of blood-that is, the offering of this type of treatment-in and of
itself constitutes negligence. Rather, the alleged negligence involves
unanticipated errors in the performance of the surgery. That said, there is
no logical way to interpret these cases without conceding that the
offering of bloodless surgery could constitute malpractice even in the
absence of any errors in performance. Jehovah's Witness patients are
regularly asked to sign legal waivers in connection with their refusal of
blood products, and at least one court has explicitly acknowledged that
assumption of risk and waiver defenses are necessary to ensure that
physicians who treat these patients are protected from liability.19 The
necessary but unspoken underlying assumption, of course, is that
physicians who perform surgery on Jehovah's Witness patients in
accordance with their religious limitations are at risk of being found
negligent even if they perform the surgery with all due care-otherwise

186. Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 9 P.3d 314 (Ariz. 2000) (finding that jury
instructions defining the specific risks the plaintiffs did and did not assume violated Arizona
constitutional requirement that defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk be left to
the jury).
187. Of the Jehovah's Witness cases cited herein, only Shorter v. Drury explicitly references
Tunkl and similar cases barring enforcement of releases in medical malpractice cases. Shorter, 103
Wash. 2d at 652-53, 695 P.2d at 120-21.
188. 613 N.E.2d 1243 (Ill. App. Ct, 1993).
189. Id. at 1251.
190. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 652-53, 695 P.2d at 120-21. That said, the court in Shorter
seemed to be addressing the risk of liability if the physician were to administer blood against the
patient's wishes, and not liability for deviating from the standard of care.
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there would be no need for such waivers. 9 1 Surely, if an expert testified
that performing a given surgical procedure without blood or blood
products would, under ordinary circumstances, be negligent, a plaintiffs
attorney might successfully argue that the act constitutes malpractice
regardless of the identity of the patient.192 While the development of
"bloodless surgery" and its increased use by non-religious patients may
make this argument more challenging to present,193 it seems to be an
unstated presumption in Jehovah's Witness cases that surgery without
blood exposes physicians to liability risk for operating outside the
standard of care.
A second peculiar element of these cases is courts' insistence that
Jehovah's Witness patients who sign releases of liability are only
assuming the risks of harm associated with refusing blood and are not
assuming the risks of physician negligence. 194 Courts rely on this
reasoning to permit malpractice suits against physicians to proceed, but
then-curiously-nevertheless allow damages to be reduced. If the
patient has not assumed the risk of physician negligence, then why is it
justifiable to reduce her damages on assumption of risk grounds?

191. In this way, Jehovah's Witness cases can be distinguished from more traditional cases of
treatment refusal. Modem principles of law and medical ethics bar physicians (in all but the most
exceptional circumstances) from providing treatment to an informed and competent patient who
refuses treatment. In such cases, withholding unwanted treatment does not constitute malpractice;
rather, it protects physicians from allegations of battery. However, there is a difference between
merely withholding unwanted treatment while providing all other care in according with medical
standards (for example, withholding unwanted dialysis from a dying patient but providing
competent palliative care), and withholding unwanted treatment while instead actively providing
risky treatment that falls outside the standard of care.
192. The success of this argument would depend on the jury's interpretation of medical custom
and of the expectations of a reasonable physician acting "in like circumstances." See supra section
1.B.
193. See Amanda Schaffer, Should Anyone Be Given a Blood Transfusion?,NEW YORKER (Aug.
13, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/should-anyone-be-given-a-blood-trans
fusion [https://perma.cc/28JQ-PX4C] (describing the development of bloodless surgery and
research supporting its efficacy and safety).
194. Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 9 P.3d 314, 319 (Ariz. 2000) (rejecting trial
court's assumption of risk jury instruction on the grounds that jury was required to make these
factual determinations, where jury instruction established that plaintiff "did not voluntarily assume
the risk of negligence by the Defendants, but... did voluntarily assume the risks relating to the
refusal to take or receive transfusions of blood or blood products"); Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d
257, 261 (I11.
App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the release barred liability for negligence in respecting
patient's refusal of a blood transfusion, but did not bar liability for negligence in diagnosis and
treatment of a medical condition, though plaintiff's recovery could be reduced for failure to mitigate
damages); Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 652-53, 695 P.2d at 124 ("Mr. and Mrs. Shorter did not assume
the risk of the negligence. The risk they did assume was the risk of death as the consequence of their
refusal to permit a blood transfusion.").
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Presumably, when courts distinguish between assuming the risk of
negligence and assuming the risk of blood loss, what they really mean is
that the patient has not relieved the physician of the duty to exercise due
care in the performance of a medical procedure but has relieved the
physician of the duty to administer blood in the event of medical
necessity. In other words, a patient's suit would be barred if it were
predicated solely on the physician's decision not to provide a blood
transfusion, but the patient would still be permitted to sue if she alleged
other negligent conduct on the part of the physician. In Garcia, for
example, the court distinguished between cases alleging negligent
diagnosis and treatment (which it stated would not be barred by a
Jehovah's Witness release), and cases "predicated upon the defendant
doctor's respect for the decedent's refusal to transfuse blood." '95 And
this distinction surely makes sense. A release of liability that relieves a
physician of the duty to administer blood should not bar suit if the
physician commits some other type of malpractice. But why, then,
should assumption of risk doctrine reduce the Jehovah's Witness
patient's damages at all?
In Shorter, for example, the court held that the patient did not assume
the risk of the "direct consequences" of the physician's negligence, but
did assume the risk of death as a consequence of refusing blood "under
any circumstances including where the doctor made what would
otherwise have been correctable surgical mistake." '96 As noted by the
dissent, however, there is a substantial difference between assuming the
risk of refusing blood in a procedure that is performed with due care, and
assuming the risk of refusing blood "even when the blood was required
because the doctor was negligent." 197 Treating the two as equivalent "in
effect hold[s] that the [patient] assumed the risk of the doctor's
195. Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In light of the
distinction drawn by the court, however, the outcome in Garcia is particularly perplexing. Garcia
sued the hospital for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, alleging that the hospital's use
of a defective heart valve caused the patient's heart surgery to take longer than expected, which in
turn led to a clotting disorder and blood loss that caused the patient's death. Id. at 1246-47. The
court concluded that a release signed by the patient completely barred suit against the hospital. Id. at
1250-51. The release noted that "unforeseen conditions" might arise during the procedure that
would necessitate the use of blood, denied authorization for blood transfusion, and released the
hospital and its physicians from liability "[i]n the event of my death as a result of not administering
blood." Id. However, the patient's suit was explicitly predicated on the hospital's breach of duty in
providing a defective heart valve, and not its "respect for the decedent's refusal to transfuse blood."
Id. at 1251. Accordingly, under the distinction drawn by the court in Garcia, the patient's suit
should not have been barred.
196. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 656, 695 P.2d at 123 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 660, 695 P.2d at 125 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
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negligence."'1 98 The more reasonable interpretation of the patient's
refusal (and one that the plaintiffs in Shorter conceded was their
understanding at the time they signed the refusal form) is that it
"represents [only] their assent to relieve [the physician] of his duty to
administer blood if required by the non-negligent performance of the
' If a court's
procedure."199
finding that a Jehovah's Witness patient who
refuses blood has not assumed the risk of the physician's negligence is to
have any merit, then express or implied assumption of risk doctrine
should not be used to reduce damages when the patient suffers injury
resulting from such negligence. °° Of course, there may be other
doctrines that would allow for a reduction in the patient's recovery-for
2 01
example, mitigation of damages.
In sum, the reasoning used by courts in Jehovah's Witness blood
refusal cases to justify enforcement of contractual releases or application
of assumption of risk doctrine is puzzling. While their decisions are
ostensibly justified on policy grounds-in an effort to ensure that
Jehovah's Witness patients are neither rejected by physicians nor forced
into treatment that violates their religious beliefs 2 2 -most courts fail to
explain why these policy justifications override the policy arguments
noted in Tunkl and other cases.20 3 Moreover, courts' insistence that
Jehovah's Witness patients are not assuming the risk of physician
negligence seems inconsistent with their application of assumption of
risk principles to reduce recovery when physicians are charged with
medical malpractice.
III.

JUSTIFYING THE "EXCEPTIONAL" CASES

As described in section II.B, there are three primary lines of objection
to the use of contract- or tort-based defenses grounded in a patient's
voluntary acceptance of risk: objections based on the strength of the

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. ("The majority concedes the Shorters did not expressly assume the risk of the doctor's
negligence. Having decided that, it logically follows that the Shorters did not expressly assume the
risk of bleeding to death as a result of refusing blood, where the need for such blood resulted from
the doctor's negligence rather than from the risks inherent in the procedure itself.").
201. See Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257, 261-62 (I1. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the
patient's religious refusal to accept blood does not exempt him from the duty to mitigate damages).
202. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 775 (in the context of patients requesting substandard
treatment, noting that in the absence of contractual protections, a physician's "only alternatives are
to fire the patient or insist that the patient accept unwanted treatment").
203. See supra section II.B.
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physician's tort, fiduciary, and professional duties; objections based on
the patient's lack of choice and bargaining power; and objections based
on the information disparity between doctor and patient. And yet, these
concerns appear to have been swept aside by courts in the limited
contexts of experimental and alternative therapy and Jehovah's Witness
patients, often with little explicit justification. These cases make clear
that the traditionalist arguments grounded in patient vulnerability and
physician duty cannot be relied upon to support an absolute prohibition
on the use of such defenses.
This Part revisits the arguments that courts have used to justify the
law's patient-protective attitude with respect to contract and tort
defenses to medical malpractice. It closely examines the Jehovah's
Witness and alternative therapy cases and concludes that the courts
deciding these cases-though rarely addressing these arguments
directly-had good reasons to conclude that the traditional bar on such
defenses was not appropriate in these contexts.2" 4 But in failing to make
clear exactly why these cases warrant an exception from the traditional
rule, the courts also failed to recognize that the justifications for treating
these cases differently could be extended to many other contexts in
which patients seek out treatment that potentially falls outside the
standard of care. Thus, this Part concludes that, in an era of consumerdirected care, perhaps these "exceptional" cases are not as exceptional as
they first might seem.
A.

Unwaivable Duties

The first argument that courts and commentators frequently raise
when rejecting defenses grounded in a patient's voluntary acceptance of
risk is that a physician's duty to deliver medical treatment in accordance
with the standard of care is absolute and cannot be waived by the
patient's voluntary agreement. According to this view, physicians' duties
are established not only by state licensing and medical malpractice laws,
but also by fiduciary and ethical principles crafted to protect patients
who hold a position of disadvantage in an inherently unequal power
relationship. Thus, patients should have no more ability to relieve their
physicians of duty to provide non-negligent care than the beneficiary of
a trust could relieve a trustee of the duties of loyalty and care.
While this claim is fundamentally appealing, it is impossible to
reconcile with the fact that numerous courts have effectively negated the
204. See also Mehiman, supra note 7 (concluding that the outcomes in these outlier cases are
justified because the cases satisfied the conditions for effective contracting).
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physician's duty to provide non-negligent care by allowing assumption
of risk and waiver defenses to be presented in experimental and
alternative treatment and Jehovah's Witness cases. While there is sure to
be some disagreement about whether a given treatment falls outside the
standard of care, there can be no question that some of the cases where
these defenses were permitted involved treatments that posed such
serious risks that the medical community as a whole rejected them as
valid medical approaches. In Charell v. Gonzalez, for example, a
physician practicing alternative medicine suggested that a patient with
uterine cancer be treated with a special diet and six coffee enemas a day,
which he assured her had a 75% success rate.2 °5 In Boyle v. Revici,2 °6 all
the parties stipulated that Dr. Revici's methods for treating cancerwhich apparently- consisted of urinalysis and ingestion of "various
mineral compounds,"E 7-vinegar, baking soda, and eggs 20 8-- constituted
violations of the standard of care. 2 9 In Poag v. Atkins,2"

°

the physician

of a patient with breast cancer encouraged her to forgo radiation and
chemotherapy, and instead recommended a regimen of vitamins and
antioxidants that medical groups considered unsafe but that the
defendant physician alleged would "definitely cure" the patient's
cancer. 211 Courts' willingness to accept assumption of risk and waiver of
liability defenses in these cases seems entirely inconsistent with the
principle that physicians cannot be relieved of the duty to provide
treatment that satisfies professional standards of care.
As noted in section II.C, the best justifications offered by courts that
have permitted these defenses to proceed are grounded in policy
preferences. In the alternative treatment and religious refusal contexts,
courts have concluded-either explicitly or implicitly-that society
would be better off allowing such treatments to continue, even though
they may fall outside the professional standard of care. For example, in
Colton, the court allowed defendants to rely on a covenant not to sue in a
205. Charell v. Gonzalez, 673 N.Y.S.2d 685, 666 (App. Div. 1998). In Charell,the lower court's
jury unanimously concluded that the physician's treatment constituted malpractice and awarded the
plaintiff over $4.5 million in damages. Id. at 667. The jury's conclusions were upheld on appeal, as
was its compensatory damage award (a $150,000 punitive damages award was later vacated). Id. at
686.
206. 961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992).
207. Id. at 1062.
208. See Revici v. Comm'r of Educ., 546 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (1989).
209. Boyle, 961 F.2d at 1062.
210. 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) (unpublished table
'decision).
211. Id. at *1.
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malpractice case concerning a highly experimental kidney transplant
procedure on the grounds that federal and state legislation indicated a
"public policy encouraging such necessary activity as experimental
medical research." 2t 2 In Shorter, the court justified its acceptance of an
express assumption of risk defense by reference to policy considerations,
noting that the alternative to allowing such defenses in Jehovah's
Witness cases would be a refusal by doctors to accept patients with
certain religious beliefs, an outcome that the court described as
"repugnant in a society which attempts to make medical care available to
all its members."2 13 In other words, if society would benefit from the
provision of unorthodox and potentially negligent treatment, physicians
ought to be allowed to provide it to informed patients without fear of
liability.
If courts in some cases are willing to accept these consequentialist
arguments, then clearly the duty-based principle requiring physicians to
provide treatment in accordance with the standard of care is not absolute.
Indeed, many commentators have taken this argument and applied it to a
broader variety of contexts beyond those of religious refusal and
experimental or alternative therapy. Scholars have argued that if we as a
society truly want to promote innovation,2 14 or cost-effective care,215 or
some other form of creativity in the delivery of medical treatment, then
assumption of risk and contractual waiver must be accepted as valid
defenses. The alternative, they claim, is that physicians with no
protection against litigation will either be unwilling to accept patients
seeking such treatment or will resort to coercing patients to accept the
standard of care.216
But the challenges to implementing policy-based exceptions to
physicians' duties of care-and drawing clear lines between cases where
defenses will be recognized and where they will be rejected-should be

212. Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 875 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
213. Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 652-53, 695 P.2d 116, 120-21 (1985).
214. See, e.g., Laakmann, supra note 8; Michael H. Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform:
The Emerging Paradigmof HolisticHealing, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79 (1995).
215. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 7; Hall & Schneider, supra note 7; supra section ILA.
216. E. Haavi Morreim, High-DeductibleHealth Plans: New Twists on Old Challengesfrom Tort
and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1231-32 (2006) (supporting an argument for assumption of
risk in the context of cost-constrained treatment by citing judicial concern that physicians would
otherwise be required to compel treatment against a patient's wishes); Hall, supra note 7, at 178
(describing "informed refusal" as a form of express assumption of risk, and noting that providing
care against a patient's informed refusal would constitute battery); Hall & Schneider, supra note 7,
at 759-60 (noting that courts "caution against liability rules that encourage doctors to coerce or
abandon patients").
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obvious. Judgments about whether society would be better off if certain
unorthodox treatments were available without risk of liability are
necessarily subjective.2 17 The academic debate about whether allowing
patients to negotiate for cost-constrained treatment will make patients
better off is just one example, albeit the most well-discussed in the
literature.218 But many other examples abound. Consider, for example,
the disputes that might arise in the already-controversial context of
reproductive rights. Pro-choice advocates who believe that women
suffering medically risky pregnancies should not be deprived of the
option to abort will fundamentally disagree with those who believe that
patients should be able to choose physicians who provide medical care
in accordance with religious directives that limit the availability of
abortion in all but the most exceptional cases. A court called upon to
decide whether patients in such contexts ought to be able to waive their
physicians' duty to provide standard of care treatment will have a
difficult time justifying its holding either way.
Similar conflicts are likely to arise when courts are called upon to
assess the societal value of any treatments at the edge of responsible
medical practice, including those described in section I.B. If courts
believe there is some value in allowing patients to seek out experimental
cancer therapy involving coffee enemas, how unusual does a treatment
need to be before a court is willing to step in to bar a physician's
assumption of risk defense when his patient dies prematurely as a result
of untreated cancer? In light of the widespread public concern about the
dramatically rising costs of health care, would it be reasonable for courts
to bind a patient to the consequences of an informed decision to seek out
sub-standard care for cost reasons? Given the tragic consequences of
botched attempts at self-amputation by patients with apotemnophilia, is
there societal value in barring malpractice suits against physicians who
perform voluntary amputations on consenting patients, even if those
patients later regret their choice? The reasoning in alternative therapy
and Jehovah's Witness cases opens the door to similar holdings in other
cases of unorthodox treatment-but how far that door opens will depend
on societal value judgments that are entirely unpredictable.

217. See Mehlman, supra note 7, at 409-10 ("Yet all bargains whereby patients wai ,e legal rights
might be said to benefit society, such as by lowering health care costs, which would argue in favor
of upholding all waivers, including those outside the experimental context."); Schuck, supra note 4,
at 912 (the fact that assumption of risk is a jury issue means it is "in reality a culturally constructed
and highly normative doctrine, one that is highly responsive to changing social values").
218. See supra section II.A.
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Thus far, the only clear line that can be drawn based on existing case
law is the line distinguishing between unanticipated negligence in the
performance of an otherwise standard treatment (whereby such
negligence is deemed to have no societal value and deserves no
protection) and the offering of treatments outside of the standard of care
that pose unique risks but that informed patients nevertheless seek out
(which may be societally beneficial in some cases).219 And while courts
have been willing to waive physicians' duty to satisfy the standard of
care in alternative treatment and Jehovah's Witness cases, their
reasoning provides no clear justification for limiting waivers to those
two contexts. Surely, other forms of unconventional treatment that the
medical profession deems to be outside standard of care may also
provide societal benefits and could likewise be justified using this
consequentialist reasoning.
B.

Freedom of Choice and Disparitiesin BargainingPower

The second argument for rejecting defenses based on a patient's
acceptance of risk is that one of elements required for truly voluntary
and informed decision-making-freedom of choice-cannot be satisfied
in medical contexts. If a patient's decision to explicitly or implicitly
assume the risks of treatment is involuntary or unfairly constrained,
there are good reasons to bar the use of these defenses. Proponents of
this position point out that patients seeking medical treatment typically
do so out of necessity, and not out of a desire to satisfy arbitrary
personal preferences. They do not choose to be sick and have no
alternative to seeking out medical care. Depending on a patient's

219. An analogy might be drawn here to the distinction drawn by E. Haavi Morreim in the
context of physicians who practice under resource constraints imposed by insurance plans. She
distinguishes between physicians' "standard of medical expertise," which encompasses the duty to
exercise clinical knowledge, skills, and judgment when treating a patient; and their "standard of
resource use," which encompasses a duty to advocate for their patients and disclose conflicts of
interest when they lack control over resource allocation. See generally E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine
Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1997); E.
Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity: Redefining the Standardof Care, 17 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 356
(1989). Under Morreim's model, physicians are always obligated to diligently apply their clinical
skills and knowledge in treating patients, but they "do not have a presumptive right to distribute
other people's money and property without their consent" and so owe no duty to patients to provide
all treatments they deem medically necessary. Morreim, StratifiedScarcity, sup ra, at 360. Similarly,
one might argue for a distinction between the physicians' choice of treatment (though in our case,
the choice is based on the patient's request rather than an insurer's resource constraint), and the
provision of that treatment in accordance with the standard of skill, knowledge, and diligence
expected of reasonable physicians. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 771 (distinguishing
between resources and skill).
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condition, she may be limited to a single treatment option. And in many
cases, a patient's choice of providers is limited to the network offered by
her insurance company, so she may be unable to "shop around" in the
way that consumers of other services can.
From this perspective, it becomes clear why courts have been more
willing to accept physician defenses in the alternative treatment and
Jehovah's Witness cases.220 These patients, while driven by medical
necessity to seek out treatment, do not seem to be at the same
disadvantage as, for example, the patient seeking emergency care in
Tunkl. In these situations, the patients are not "settling" in their choice of
treatment or providers; rather, they are taking affirmative steps to seek
out physicians willing to provide treatments that best align with their
preferences and values (albeit treatments that arguably fall outside the
standard of care).221 However, beyond the limited contexts of
experimental, alternative, and religiously-directed treatment, the same
argument could be made any time a patient makes an informed decision
to receive her first-choice treatment from a willing provider-in such
case, there would likewise seem to be no lack of options, voluntariness,
or bargaining power.
The only perspective from which such a decision might be considered
unfairly constrained is with respect to the patient's ability to negotiate
with her provider for different terms regarding risk allocation. In Tunkl
and other cases, courts justify their rejection of liability waivers on the
grounds that patients seeking medical care are at an inherent bargaining
disadvantage, specifically with respect to the opportunity to negotiate for
greater legal protection from malpractice.222 And yet, this concern about
patients' lack of bargaining power, so prominent in cases like Tunkl and
among opponents of contract-based approached to health care, does not
seem to cause the same consternation in all contexts. For example,
Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious convictions bar them from
receiving blood or blood products, have only two choices when seeking
surgical care: receive treatment from a provider who is willing to operate
without blood, or forgo surgery entirely. Because surgeons are unlikely
220. See MehIman, supranote 7.
221. Kenneth Simons, in a seminal article on assumption of risk doctrine, relies on this
distinction. He argues that assumption of risk should be a valid defense in cases of "full preference"
(where a plaintiff really does prefer to encounter a defendant's negligence than to pursue a lessrisky option) and in cases of "victim insistence on a relationship" (where a plaintiff insists on a
relationship with the tortious actor, such relationship primarily benefits the plaintiff, and the
defendant either voluntarily chooses to accept the relationship with the plaintiff or has no
opportunity to refuse it). Simons, supra note 109, at 504-06, 513-17.
222. See supra section II.B.2.
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to operate on patients committed to refusing blood even in lifethreatening circumstances without a release, these patients are
effectively forced to sign releases from liability for injuries resulting
from blood loss if they want to receive treatment. In this sense, the
religious patient's choice to receive medical services in the absence of
tort law protections is just as involuntary as the choice of a patient of
limited financial means, as in Tunkl or Ash. One patient is restricted in
the treatment she can obtain by virtue of religious belief; the other is
restricted by virtue of financial constraints. And yet, courts in Jehovah's
Witness cases point to the patient's lack of options as a justification for
allowing acceptance of risk defenses, rather than an objection. The
experimental and alternative treatment cases follow a similar modelcourts note that patients who reject mainstream treatment and instead
seek out alternative therapy might, in the absence of acceptance of risk
defenses, never find providers willing to treat them. 23 Surely, these
patients would prefer to retain the right to sue, but in these contexts,
courts seem to have no qualms about enforcing releases of liability or
accepting assumption of risk as a defense.
In fact, patients seeking out unorthodox care actually seem to be in a
worse position to bargain for liability protections. In cases like Tunki,
where concerns about patients' voluntary choice regularly arise, patients
are seeking out high-quality treatment, and wish to retain a remedy if
that treatment is performed negligently-an outcome both patient and
provider are hoping to avoid. But in the cases discussed in section II.C,
arguing that the patients should have the option to retain the right to sue
for malpractice seems nonsensical. In these cases, both doctor and
patient are committed to a treatment plan that, even if performed as
intended, potentially constitutes malpractice. When both parties
anticipate the risk that the provider's treatment might be outside the
standard of care, there is no world in which the patient could receive this
treatment and meaningfully retain the right to sue. In contrast, it is
possible to imagine a scenario where a physician offering standard
treatment allows a patient to bargain for legal protection in exchange for
higher fees, because he believes the chances of his committing
unintentional negligence are low.
Perhaps, then, it is this contrast that justifies the differential treatment
of these cases. Because physicians offering standard of care treatment
223. See, e.g., Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting that in the
absence of "having the patient execute a comprehensive consent containing appropriate information
as to the risks involved," a practitioner of alternative or "non-conventional" medicine could not
prevail in a malpractice case).
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may vary in their use of waivers of liability, and may be willing to
negotiate the shifting of liability risk with patients willing to pay higher
fees, there is a risk that permitting waivers of liability in typical
malpractice cases might lead to a two-tiered system of medical care.
Patients with financial means may be able to negotiate with providers to
retain the right to litigate in the event of medical malpractice, while
patients who are in desperate need of care or who lack the resources to
negotiate with or to select physicians will have no choice but to accept
the terms presented to them. Such a stratified system of care, according
to many courts, would be unacceptable.224 In contrast, in the context of
unorthodox care that by its very nature likely constitutes negligence and
where waivers are effectively a precondition of treatment, no patient is at
a disadvantage with respect to any other patient, and there is little
potential for stratification based on ability to pay.
This explanation, however, seems unsatisfactory. Courts' language
emphasizing the importance of preserving choice and fair opportunities
for bargaining when seeking medical care is consistently emphatic and
does not seem to distinguish between different treatment contexts. Thus,
it would seem odd to conclude that courts only care about patients' lack
of bargaining power in contexts where some patients have the ability to
bargain, but are willing to overlook medical providers' significant
bargaining advantage in cases where all patients lack bargaining power.
What other explanation might be offered to justify the differential
treatment of Jehovah's Witness and alternative therapy cases? It seems
that the only real difference is the one highlighted initially-that in these
unorthodox treatment cases, patients are receiving their first choice of
treatment and providers, whereas in many other contexts patients'
choices may be limited by their financial means and insurance coverage.
For example, patients seeking treatment at a low-cost clinic because it is
the only care they can afford might prefer to go to a top-ranked hospital
that does not require a liability waiver, but this choice is not available to
them.225 Thus, setting aside patients' ability (or lack thereof) to bargain
for legal protection from malpractice, the typical patient's choice seems
less voluntary than the choice of the patient pursuing care outside the

224. See section II.B.2.
225. It is worth noting that patients seeking low-cost care at federally qualified health centers are
in fact barred, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, from suing the health centers and their employees
for injuries suffered as a result of negligent medical care. About the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://bphc.hrsa.gov/ftca/about/index.html
[https://perma.cc/H5CV-XT5J]. However, the patients do retain a right of recovery against the
federal government. Id.
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medical mainstream. As a result, courts might be less willing to bind the
typical patient to a contractual waiver or find that she voluntarily
assumed the risk of negligent treatment.226
The challenge with this distinction is that it rests upon a post facto
assessment of the patient's preferences and wishes, and does not lend
itself to a bright-line rule. For example, a second patient at the same
low-cost clinic may be wealthy but frugal, and eager to save money in
exchange for abandoning his right to legal recourse in the unlikely event
of malpractice. If this type of bargain is the patient's true preference,
then under the model described above he would be permitted to waive
his right to sue, but the first patient would not. But it seems very
unlikely that a court would be willing to draw such fine distinctions
when analyzing the validity of defenses based on a patient's voluntary
acceptance of risk.
Thus, while courts consistently highlight the disparity in bargaining
power between doctor and patient to justify rejection of waiver and
assumption of risk defenses, they do not appear to do so consistently. In
Jehovah's Witness and alternative therapy cases, courts are willing to
consider these defenses despite the patients' complete lack of bargaining
power-and, surprisingly, there appears to be no principled justification
for this outcome. Without a clear justification, it is impossible to draw a
dividing line between these two contexts and the many others where
patients might seek treatment outside the standard of care that would not
be available to them if their physicians had no legal protection. The
holdings in these cases call into question the widely accepted principle
that patients, who as a general rule lack bargaining power as against
their medical providers, should retain the right to sue for negligence
even when they expressly or implicitly assume the risks of that
negligence. Ultimately, the courts' holdings in the Jehovah's Witness
and experimental treatment cases seem to suggest that as long as a
patient in need of medical care makes an informed decision to seek her
first choice of treatment from a willing medical provider, and that
treatment inherently falls outside the standard of care, a waiver of
liability will be enforceable even if the patient had no opportunity to
bargain with her provider for greater protection.

226. This distinction speaks to the concern mentioned in section III.A about unintentional
negligence versus intentional negligence.
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Information Disparity

The final concern raised in cases rejecting contract- and tort-based
defenses based on a patient's acceptance of risk speaks to the
information disparity between doctor and patient. Proponents of this
view note that patients are at an inherent informational disadvantage
compared to physicians-not only in terms of understanding the risks
and benefits of various treatment options, but also in terms of
understanding the likelihood of malpractice and the risks associated with
losing legal protection in the event that malpractice does occur.
As to the former concern, which would be fatal to any assumption of
risk defense,227 the foundational principles underlying the doctrine of
informed consent effectively negate this argument. Provided the patient
is fully informed of the comparative risks and benefits of various
treatment options (including those more in keeping with standard
medical practices), as is already required by law, the information
imbalance between doctor and patient is minimized. Thus, when a
patient is actively seeking out treatment that a jury might find to be
outside the standard of care-as in the case of experimental treatment or
completely bloodless surgery-and her provider has satisfied his legal
obligation to disclose the inherent risks and benefits of the requested
treatment and its alternatives, there can be no concern that the patient
lacks the medical information needed to make a voluntary choice.22 8 In
contrast, the validity of patient's assumption of risk can be questioned if
her physician fails to accurately disclose the inherent risks and benefits
of the treatment,2 29 or if her physician's negligent conduct results in
harms beyond the disclosed inherent risks of treatment.23 °

227. In contrast, enforcement of a contractual waiver does not require proof of such specific
knowledge on the part of the patient.
228. But see Mehlman, supra note 7, at 391-93 (noting that a physician's disclosure duties under
the doctrine of informed consent are narrower than should be required under a doctrine of "fiduciary
disclosure").
229. Surprisingly, however, some of the experimental treatment cases have held that a patient
may be informed enough to assume the risk of negligent medical treatment even if her physician
fails to accurately disclose the inherent risks and benefits of the treatment. In these cases, courts
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of assumption of risk where
patients had independent knowledge of the experimental or alternative therapy, but disclosure by
physicians was allegedly lacking. See supra note 163. The problems with this approach are
discussed in greater detail in section W.A. 1.
230. This distinction aligns with the distinction courts draw between cases where patients
intentionally seek out treatment that, if performed as intended, falls outside the standard of care, and
those where an otherwise standard treatment is negligently performed. See supra section III.A.
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The other perspective from which patients might be considered to be
at an informational disadvantage as compared to physicians is that some
patients might not be aware that, by proceeding with a risky treatment or
signing a contractual waiver, they are limiting their right to sue for
malpractice.2 3 Given that contract law requires exculpatory clauses to
be clear and unambiguous, such that the signatory understands the rights
she is waiving, a patient's inability to understand the consequences of
signing a waiver would be fatal to its enforcement.2 32 And yet, this very
legitimate concern cannot fully explain the divergent outcomes in the
cases discussed herein. In Tunkl, for example, the patient signed a
document that included the following language:
RELEASE: The hospital is a nonprofit, charitable institution. In
consideration of the hospital and allied services to be rendered
and the rates charged therefor, the patient or his legal
representative agrees to and hereby releases The Regents of the
University of California, and the hospital from any and all
liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its
employees, if the hospital has used due care in selecting its
233
employees.
By any account of contract interpretation, this language seems clear
and specific enough to put a signatory on notice of the rights being
waived. And yet, despite the satisfaction of the formalities required for
exculpatory clauses-and despite the court's deference to the jury's
determination that the plaintiff "either knew or should have known the
significance of the release"-the court refused to enforce the release on
policy grounds.234 In contrast, some courts in Jehovah's Witness cases
have carefully evaluated the precision and specificity of contractual
language in order to reach decisions as to the enforceability of a waiver.
In Garcia, for example, the court held that a release signed by a
Jehovah's Witness patient that "explicitly delineated the desires and
231. Some authors suggest that this problem might be solved by requiring fiduciary standards of
disclosure regarding the legal consequences of a patient's choice to proceed with risky treatment.
See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 7, at 383 (suggesting that a fiduciary disclosure model would require
disclosure of information regarding "allocation of risk").
232. The tort defense of assumption of risk, in contrast, does not require knowledge on the part of
the patient that proceeding with treatment with knowledge of its risks might bar recovery if those
risks manifest themselves-assumption of risk is implied by behavior.
233. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 442 (Cal. 1963).
234. In a footnote, the court noted that at the time the plaintiff signed the release, he "was in great
pain, under sedation, and probably unable to read." Id. at 442 n.1. However, the court did not
overturn the jury's finding that the plaintiff "either knew or should have known the significance of
the release." Id.
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intentions of both parties" barred the patient's suit as a matter of law. 235
But in Corlett, the court held that a similar release of liability for surgery
without blood did not bar a malpractice suit, because the language of the
release did not specifically relieve physician from liability for
negligence in diagnosis and treatment.2 36
Thus, while the disparity in understanding between doctor and patient
as to the legal implications of a decision to proceed with treatment may
certainly justify non-enforcement of contractual releases that lack the
appropriate language, 237 decisions in cases like Tunkl show that
correction of this informational disparity is not sufficient to save such
releases.
The experimental treatment, alternative treatment, and Jehovah's
Witness cases, then, seem to establish that as long as a patient is
informed of the risks and benefits of the various treatment options
(whether by way of an informed consent conversation with the physician
or through the patient's independent knowledge), and as long as any
contractual language waiving liability is sufficiently precise, there is no
meaningful informational disadvantage that would bar the use of tort or
contract defenses based on voluntary acceptance of risk where the
patient suffers injury as a result of a risk inherent in a medical
procedure--even if the physician violated the standard of care by
offering that procedure.
IV. CAUTIONS AND CHALLENGES
Part III reconsidered the "exceptional" alternative treatment and
Jehovah's Witness cases in light of the three traditional objections to the
use of contract- and tort-based defenses based on a patient's voluntary
acceptance of risk. It concluded that while there are good reasons for
courts to treat these cases differently from typical cases of medical
malpractice, those reasons would likewise be applicable to many other

235. Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (I11.
App. Ct. 1993).
236. Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
237. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that the covenant not to
sue in the consent form signed by the patient was unenforceable due to lack of precision);
Abramowitz v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., Coll. of Dentistry, 494 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (App. Div. 1985)
(rejecting an exculpatory clause on the grounds that the contractual language did not "unmistakenly
express an intention on the part of the plaintiff to absolve the defendant of liability for its own
negligence"); Poag v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005)
(unpublished table decision) (rejecting exculpatory agreement in a medical malpractice case because
"no separate heading or caption was present to alert the decedent that she was foregoing the right to
bring suit").
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contexts in which patients knowingly and voluntarily pursue unorthodox
and potentially negligent treatment.
First, these cases demonstrate that the physician's duty to provide
treatment in accordance with the standard of care is by no means
absolute. Where judges or juries believe that the non-standard treatment
serves greater societal interests not recognized by a strict interpretation
of the medical community's standards, they are willing to waive a
physician's duty to comply with the standard of care (or at least limit
liability to some degree).
Second, despite courts' and commentators' insistence that patients
should not be able to waive their right to sue because of their bargaining
disadvantage with respect to medical providers, the alternative treatment
and Jehovah's Witness cases belie this notion. Even in situations where
physicians would flatly refuse to provide treatment to patients with lifethreatening illnesses in the absence of liability protection, courts have
been willing to recognize some patients' decisions to explicitly or
implicitly waive their right to sue.
Finally, while the information disparity between doctor and patient is
certainly a concern, these cases demonstrate that it is possible for a
patient to be informed enough to voluntarily assume the risk of negligent
medical treatment. If the medical risks and injuries that manifest
themselves are those inherent in the requested treatment-where that
treatment, even if performed as intended, falls outside the standard of
care-then a patient's informed consent to treatment effectively serves
as a defense to liability. And some cases, surprisingly, found sufficient
evidence of assumption of risk even where disclosure by physicians was
allegedly lacking, but patients possessed independent knowledge of the
risks of treatment.
Based on these precedents, we can conclude that beyond the contexts
of patients seeking experimental, alternative, or religiously-directed
treatment, courts have good reason to be receptive to contract- and tortbased defenses when patients knowingly and voluntarily seek out
treatment that falls outside the standard of care, as long as: (a) patients
are fully informed of the treatment's medical risks and benefits, as well
as the risks and benefits of alternative available treatments; (b) the
treatment is performed in accordance with expectations, such that the
risks that ultimately arise are those inherent in the treatment-that is, not
caused by unanticipated error in the performance or administration of the
treatment; and (c) the legal factfinder believes there is some societal
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value in having this treatment available, even if the medical community
238
as a whole rejects it.
A.

Additional Requirementsfor PatientProtection

As a descriptive matter, the cases discussed in this Article support the
use of contract- and tort-based defenses in medical malpractice cases
upon the satisfaction of the above three conditions. Normatively,
however, I argue that additional conditions ought to be imposed to
strengthen protections for patients, particularly with respect to ensuring
that a patient's consent is fully informed and voluntary.
1.

Satisfaction of Physician'sInformed Consent Duties

The most concerning conclusion in at least some of these cases is the
suggestion that a patient might be deemed informed enough to assume
the risk of treatment even ifher physician did not fully inform her of the
risks of treatment.
In Charell,for example, the court found sufficient evidence to support
an informed consent claim where the physician told his patient that an
alternative therapy had a 75% success rate, failed to disclose that he was
not an oncologist, failed to inform her that the treatment was
experimental and not generally accepted among physicians, and failed to
provide information about the risks of and alternatives to the treatment
protocol.2 39 Nevertheless, the court upheld the jury's finding that the
plaintiff impliedly assumed the risk of treatment, noting that the patient
had sufficient knowledge of the risks of treatment from sources other
than her physician.2 4" The court pointed out that the plaintiff was "a
well-educated person who... did a significant amount of investigation
regarding the treatment being offered by defendant and hence became
quite knowledgeable on the subject."24' 1 Similarly, in Poag,the physician
allegedly assured the patient that an alternative treatment involving
vitamins and antioxidants could "definitely cure" her breast cancer, and
did not inform her that the treatment protocol was experimental and

238. It is this final requirement that poses the greatest challenge in any efforts to predict the
outcome of cases where patients are harmed as a result of unorthodox treatments like those
described in section I.B. There is simply no accounting for judges' and jurors' varying perspectives
on the value of such treatments to society. See discussion supra section III.A.
239. Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
240. Id. at 669.
241. Id.
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considered unsafe by some medical groups.24 2 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that there was a triable issue of fact as to what risks the
plaintiff was actually informed of and whether she impliedly assumed
these risks.24 3
It is troubling to think that a physician might benefit from defenses
based on a patient's acceptance of risk despite having breached his duty
to inform the patient of the risks of treatment and its alternatives.
Nevertheless-and perhaps surprisingly-it is not doctrinally illogical.
As Mehlman notes, pure applications of contract and tort law do not
effectively account for the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient

relationship.2 44 The traditional tort defense of assumption of risk, for
example, requires only that a plaintiff voluntarily choose to encounter
known risks-it does not speak to how the plaintiff obtains knowledge
of these risks. Contract law, of course, imposes greater disclosure duties
on defendants, by requiring that the contractual language in liability
waivers (typically drafted by defendants) specifically define the scope of
risk the plaintiff is assuming. However, neither contract nor tort defenses
impose a non-delegable duty 245 on the defendant to communicate-in
detail and in person-both the risks and benefits of the encounter the
plaintiff is choosing to pursue, and the risks and benefits of alternative
options the plaintiff might choose.2 46 Thus, in a case like Charrell, a
242. Poag, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *1 (unpublished table decision).
243. Id.
244. See generally Mehlman, supranote 7.
245. The physician's duty to obtain a patient's informed consent is widely viewed as a duty that
cannot be delegated to others. See, e.g., Robert Garter, The Mysterious Survival of the Policy
Against Informed Consent Liabilityfor Hospitals, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2006)
(noting that "established law.., presumes that control over-and, consequently, responsibility
for-informed consent should reside exclusively with physicians"); Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429,
453-54 (Pa. 2017) (holding that under Pennsylvania's informed consent statute, the duty to secure a
patient's informed consent rests exclusively with the physician and cannot be delegated).
246. Moreover, some scholars suggest that the enforcement of waivers of liability ought not be
conditioned on proof of an informed consent-type disclosure conversation. For example, Hall and
Schneider-in arguing that patients' refusals of standard care for cost reasons should be treated as
an issue of contract (rather than tort)-conclude that the law "should not require special evidence or
proof of informed refusal, assumption of risk, or waiver of liability" when evaluating a patient's
contractual refusal, provided there is no fraud or misrepresentation on the physician's part. Hall &
Schneider, supra note 7, at 775. Hall and Schneider justify their position by noting that when
patients refuse recommended care, physicians already "have incentives to convince patients to say
yes," and that therefore "the law need not scrutinize how vigorously they did so." Id. In arguing
against "full-bore informed consent" for patient refusals of costly treatment, Hall and Schneider
seem to distinguish refusals of treatment from consent to treatment. Id. I find this distinction
untenable. When a patient refuses the standard of care treatment and opts for a less-costly
alternative, there are elements of both refusal and consent. Unless the patient is refusing any
treatment, she will have to provide consent for the treatment she ultimately chooses-and as a legal
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patient might be limited in her right of recovery for medical malpractice,
while still retaining an independent right to recover for an informed
247
consent violation.
I posit, however, that a physician's legal duties under the doctrine of
informed consent should not be disentangled from his right to raise a
defense when a patient chooses an unorthodox treatment that may
constitute medical malpractice. Allowing physicians to benefit from
defenses based on a patient's voluntary acceptance of risk when they
have not fully informed their patients of the risks of treatment-while
perhaps permissible under pure doctrines of contractual waiver and
assumption of risk-is fundamentally inconsistent with the medical
profession's legal and ethical duties of disclosure. To meaningfully
protect patients' interests in such cases, physicians should be able to rely
on contract- and tort-based defenses only if they satisfy their obligation
to secure the patient's informed consent to treatment.
Of course, some might argue that conditioning malpractice defenses
on satisfaction of the physician's informed consent obligations is
insufficiently protective of patient interests. The idea that a patient's
informed consent to negligent treatment might effectively constitute an
assumption of risk is in itself highly controversial. 248 This is because the
legal and ethical doctrines of informed consent are fundamentally tools
for patient protection-they grant patients a right to receive information
from their physicians that furthers their ability to make autonomous
decisions, and allow patients to recover damages if their physicians do
not satisfy their disclosure obligations. Assumption of risk and waiver of
liability, in contrast, are tools for physician protection-they grant
patients no rights and operate only to reduce patients' ability to recover
damages. Thus, some might argue that it is unfair to tie these two
doctrines together at all-that a rights-conferring doctrine (informed
consent) should never be used in a way that reduces or eliminates a
plaintiffs legal remedies.
matter, this requires the physician to disclose the risks and benefits of the various treatment options,
including the standard of care the patient has refused.
247. This would be one rare context in which the common criticism that informed consent and
malpractice actions are redundant would not apply. See Hall et al., supra note 113, at 431 (noting
that where a claim for informed consent "overlaps with ordinary malpractice,... it is mostly
redundant" because deviation from the customary standard of care constitutes negligence,
"regardless of the presence or absence of consent").
248. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Making Religion Transparent 10 (2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (referring critically to the idea that informed consent might be
treated as an assumption of risk in the context of health care providers' religious refusals to provide
treatment).
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While there is certainly merit to this position, I believe that it does not
account for the true richness of the principle of patient autonomy.
Respecting a competent person's autonomous decision sometimes means
allowing that person to make a choice that others think is unreasonable.
And while many critics have argued that the pendulum of medical
practice has swung too far in the direction of patient autonomy at the
expense of other important ethical principles (like justice and
beneficence),249 that argument does not speak to the precise issue
addressed in this Article. Certainly, in some exceptional cases, one
might opt to balance the values of beneficence and autonomy in such a
way that would justify overriding a patient's informed decision and
imposing treatment against the patient's will. But if a patient has already
made a decision and acted upon it, the opportunity to protect the patient
from making a poor choice has already passed-the balance of values
has already been struck. If we value autonomy enough to permit patients
to make such choices without interference by state actors or medical
professionals, then it seems incongruous to justify retroactively freeing
these patients from the consequences of their informed and autonomous
choices.25 °
2.

Addressing PhysicianInfluence

Another question to consider in developing a more patient-protective
approach is whether a physician's recommendation might be so
influential that it would effectively render the patient's treatment
decision non-autonomous. As a result of the power dynamic inherent in
the physician-patient relationship, physicians have significant ability to
influence patient decision-making. That is, even if two physicians
present identical facts about treatment options, their recommendations as
to treatment, or the way in which they frame those facts, may sway a
patient's decision.2 1' Given how much a physician's own perspective
249. See, e.g., Moulton & King, supra note 26, at 88 (discussing criticism of "a decision-making
model that relies entirely on patient autonomy"); Quill & Brody, supra note 19, at 764 (arguing that
misunderstanding about what it means to respect patient autonomy has led physicians to neglect
their duties to advise patients).
250. Taking this approach would treat a patient's informed agreement to receive treatment from a
physician as a type of voidable contract. Typically, contracts are only voidable if they are made
under conditions of coercion, fraud, or minority. See generally WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra
note 96, § 1:20.
251. See generally Judith Covey, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of PresentingTreatment Benefits
in Different Formats, 27 MED. DECISION MAKING 638 (2007); Theresa M. Marteau, Framing of
Information: Its Influence on Decisions of Doctors and Patients, 28 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 89
(1989).
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can influence his patients' decisions, there is a concern that the
"voluntariness" required for a patient to effectively assume a risk
(whether implicitly or by way of contract) may be compromised.
To a certain extent, this is an unavoidable problem. Every decision a
person makes is based on innumerable factors and influences. Claiming
that a person's decision is non-autonomous simply because it has been
influenced by another's perspective is a difficult argument to defend.
Furthermore, principles of medical ethics explicitly acknowledge that
physicians do have a role in advising patients, and that complete
neutrality
in
conveying
factual
information
without any
acknowledgment of values neglects important aspects of the physician's
252
fiduciary obligations.
In the types of cases described in this Article, moreover, patients are
often the ones driving medical decision-making-sometimes over their
physicians' initial objections. In such cases, there is little opportunity for
undue physician influence. For example, a Jehovah's Witness patient
whose religious convictions bar the use of blood products is unlikely to
be swayed by any recommendation to transfuse blood. While a patient
whose values are not quite so absolute, such as a patient who prefers
alternative therapy to conventional treatment, is perhaps more likely to
be affected by a physician's recommendation, such patients often choose
their physicians specifically because they are willing to offer treatments
that align with the patient's values. 253 Thus, one could argue that
physicians should be able to benefit from assumption of risk-based
defenses only if the patient's commitment to an unorthodox treatment is
so fixed that the physician has little ability to influence the patient's
decision. This, however, is an extremely fact-sensitive determination
(and one that is, moreover, subject to significant hindsight bias), so it is
unlikely that courts would be willing to recognize the patient's
motivation as a factor in adjudicating malpractice cases.

252. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the PhysicianPatientRelationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992); Moulton & King, supra note 26; Quill and Brody,
supranote 19.
253. In Poag v. Atkins and Schneider v. Revici, for example, the patients sought out Drs. Atkins
and Revici after hearing them speak on radio programs about the benefits of alternative treatment.
Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1987); Poag v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL
2219689, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) (unpublished table decision). In Charell, the patient
pursued alternative treatment with Dr. Gonzales, whom she knew about through his tapes and
lectures, because she had "witnessed the severe discomfort experienced by a relative who had
undertaken chemotherapy and radiation." Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (Sup. Ct.
1997).
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A more practical way of addressing issues of physician influence is to
consider whether the physician had any clear conflicts of interest in
making a treatment recommendation (besides the obvious financial
benefit inherent in providing medical treatment in exchange for
payment). There is precedent suggesting that physicians have a legal
obligation to disclose financial conflicts of interest that may influence
their treatment decisions. In Moore v. Regents, University of
California,54 a case in which a physician provided unnecessary medical
services to a patient without disclosing his own financial incentives in
commercial development of a cell line from the patient's blood, the
California Supreme Court held that "a physician who is seeking a
patient's consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his
fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's informed consent, disclose
personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or
economic, that may affect his medical judgment. 25 5 In a number of
malpractice cases against physicians whose medical recommendations
were influenced by HMO financial incentives, courts also recognized
that a physician's failure to disclose financial incentives might constitute
256
a breach of duty.
Thus, one additional mechanism for patient protection would be to
allow physicians to rely on these defenses only if they have disclosed to
the patient any personal conflicts of interest that might affect their
treatment recommendations. As noted above, this is already a
requirement for the satisfaction of the physician's informed consent
duties under common law. Thus, this recommendation would follow
neatly from the recommendation presented above that physicians' use of
these defenses be conditioned on the satisfaction of their common law
duty to obtain a patient's informed consent. 7
Patient advocates, however, might argue that disclosure of conflicts of
interest is insufficient to protect patients from undue physician influence.

254. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
255. Id. at 485.
256. Shea v. Eisensten, 208 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a jury could find
physicians liable for negligent misrepresentation for failing to disclose a financial incentive to avoid
referrals, where this failure to disclose prevented the plaintiff "from making an informed choice of
whether to seek what might have been a life-saving referral at his own expense"); Neade v. Portes,
739 N.E.2d. 496, 502-03 (Ill. 2000) (finding that a fiduciary duty claim for failure to disclose
financial incentives was duplicative of the medical malpractice claim); DAB v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d
168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a physician's failure to disclose a kickback scheme
"presents a classic informed consent issue"); see generally Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing
Informed Consent, 2016 U. ILL. L. REv. 821, 842.
257. See supra section IV.A.1.
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Rather, perhaps physicians with financial conflicts of interest ought to be
barred entirely from reliance on assumption of risk and waiver defenses,
even if their conflicts have been disclosed. I believe that this approach,
however, goes one step too far. As explained above,258 so long as we are
willing to allow patients to choose treatment options in which their
physicians have financial interests, there is no reason to permit those
patients, under ordinary circumstances, to seek legal recovery for the
consequences of their informed and voluntary decisions.
3.

Disclosureof Deviationsfrom the Standard of Care

While the requirement that physicians fully inform their patients
about the risks and benefits of a selected treatment and its alternatives
would be sufficient to satisfy legal standards of informed consent, it may
overlook other ways in which patients' decisions might not be fully
informed or autonomous. Imagine, for example, a patient who chooses
to accept a treatment with a 10% chance of success without knowing that
the treatment falls outside the standard of care (and therefore, that the
physician's provision of this treatment constitutes malpractice). In such a
case, the patient might allege that had she known the treatment was
outside the standard of care, she would not have pursued it. In other
words, she would only have been willing to accept a treatment with a
10% chance of success had she known that the treatment was within the
professional standard of care.
However, it is by no means clear that a traditional informed consent
claim on these grounds-where the claim rests on a lack of disclosure as
to whether the proposed treatment is within the standard of care-would
be successful. While there is no case law on this precise issue, courts in
other contexts have held that a regulatory body's approval of a treatment
is not a "material risk" that must be disclosed under the common law of
informed consent.25 9 Numerous cases dealing with off-label use of drugs

258. Id.

259. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1014, 1996 WL 107556, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. '8, 1996) (holding that a physician cannot be liable under informed consent "for failing to
advise a patient that a particular device has been given an administrative or regulatory label by the
FDA"); see also, e.g., Alvarez v. Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
the FDA status of metal screws used in plaintiff's spinal surgery was not a "medical risk" that must
be disclosed as part of informed consent); Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 919 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (holding that because FDA regulatory status "do[es] not speak directly to the
medical issues surrounding a particular surgery" it need not be disclosed as part of informed
consent); Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d 225, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that "off-label use of
a medical device is not a material risk" that must be disclosed as part of the informed consent
process); Southard v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 781 A.2d 101, 107 (Pa. 2001) (holding that because
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and devices-that is, the use of FDA-approved drugs and devices for a
purpose outside the scope of the FDA's approval-have concluded that
physicians have no duty to disclose to patients that the treatments they
are providing are not FDA-approved for a particular purpose. 260 That
said, many off-label uses are, in fact, within the standard of care. In
contrast, use of a drug or device that has not been approved by the FDA
as safe and effective for any purpose-which likely would constitute
malpractice outside the context of clinical research-could potentially be
viewed as material to a patient's treatment decision and therefore within
the scope of informed consent.
But even if a treatment's deviation from the standard of care is not
within the traditional scope of informed consent disclosure, there is an
argument to be made that a physician's reliance on assumption of risk as
a defense-which requires a plaintiffs voluntary choice to encounter a
known risk-requires proof that the plaintiff knew the physician would
be deviating from the standard of care.
Unfortunately, the assumption of risk jurisprudence regarding this
issue is unclear. Secondary assumption of risk requires a showing that
the plaintiff voluntarily encountered a known risk of the defendant's
negligence. But there is no doctrinal guidance as to whether the
knowledge requirement is satisfied when the plaintiff is aware of the
risks of proceeding with an activity (i.e., a particular type of physical
injury), or whether it requires the more specific knowledge that these
risks exist only as a result of a breach of duty by the defendant.
Nevertheless, a hypothetical should demonstrate that knowledge of a
defendant's breach cannot be a legal requirement for secondary implied
assumption of risk, as long as the plaintiff is aware of the specific risks
FDA labeling "does not constitute a material fact, risk, complication or alternative to a surgical
procedure," it need not be disclosed as part of the informed consent process). But see Corrigan v.
Methodist Hosp., 869 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that allegations that a doctor
failed to disclose the "investigational" status of bone screws used in plaintiff's surgery raised a
triable issue of fact as to informed consent); Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 874 F. Supp. 657, 659
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (same). See also James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and
Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71 (1998)
(collecting cases on this issue and concluding that "[b]ecause FDA regulatory status of medical
devices and drugs is irrelevant to the nature, risks, benefits, or alternatives of medical procedures,
there is and should be no legal or ethical obligation for physicians to discuss FDA regulatory status
issues with their patients").
260. See supra note 259. However, some commentators disagree with this outcome. One article
notes that "[t]he view that off-label status is not material to a patient's decision to accept a particular
course of treatment is rationalized on the wobbly ground that off-label status is a regulatory fact, not
a medical fact, and thus that it does 'not speak directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular
[use]."' Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of
Physicians' Off-Label Prescribing,86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 672 (2011).
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he is encountering. Imagine, for example, a skier who encounters a trail
that is not smoothed or well-packed, and is covered with large chunks of
ice. The skier should understand that skiing down this dangerous trail
poses additional risks beyond the inherent risks in skiing a wellmaintained trail, and so can be said to have assumed these additional
risks if he chooses to proceed. However, the skier may not know
whether the condition of the trail is due to the trail operator's negligence.
For example, the trail's condition may be the result of an avalanche that
occurred seconds ago; if no reasonable facility operator would have been
able to correct the condition or provide a warning in that brief time, then
the skier would not be able to recover because there was no breach of
duty ("primary assumption of risk"). But if, unbeknownst to the plaintiff,
the condition of the trail was due to negligent maintenance by the facility
operator, it would seem odd to bar the use of secondary assumption of
risk as a defense simply because the plaintiff did not know that the
additional risks she was encountering were the result of a breach of duty.
A dangerous trail is dangerous regardless of whether the danger was
caused by natural and unavoidable conditions or by a defendant's
negligence. Holding that a plaintiff should be able to recover in full
when the plaintiff encounters a danger without knowing it was caused by
a defendant's negligence---despite the plaintiffs knowledge, awareness,
and voluntary acceptance of the dangerous condition itself-seems
inconsistent with the principles underlying the doctrine of assumption of
risk.
Applying this reasoning to the medical context, there seems to be no
doctrinal reason to bar the use of implied or express assumption of risk
as a defense when a patient chooses to proceed with a treatment with the
understanding that it poses specific risks, simply on the grounds that the
patient did not know that the physician's provision of that treatment was
itself a breach of duty.
But as with the informed consent requirements discussed in section
IV.A.1, the fact that the tort doctrine of assumption of risk does not
require specific knowledge of a defendant's breach may have troubling
implications in the context of medical treatment. As noted above, pure
applications of contract and tort law do not account for the fiduciary
aspects of the doctor-patient relationship, and there are policy reasons
why we might impose additional requirements on physicians claiming
these defenses-as compared to widget manufacturers, for example. The
arguments for imposing a requirement that physicians disclose their
deviations from the standard of care would be similar to those for
imposing such a disclosure duty under informed consent law-that
patients, more so than plaintiffs in non-medical contexts, are at an
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informational disadvantage as compared to defendant physicians. The
common law of informed consent (requiring disclosure of the risks and
benefits of various treatment options that would be material to a
patient's decision) developed in order to correct this informational
imbalance. But surely a patient cannot make a fully informed and
voluntary decision about whether to proceed with a risky treatment if she
does not know that the treatment falls outside the standard of care and
has been rejected by the medical community.
Thus, although common law may not currently require that physicians
disclose deviations from the standard of care (whether to satisfy their
informed consent duties or benefit from assumption of risk-based
defenses), there are strong policy arguments for requiring such
disclosure. The expansion of assumption of risk and contractual waiver
defenses to a broader set of medical contexts should be tied to additional
patient protections-here, a requirement that physicians who wish to
protect themselves from liability when their patients choose medical
malpractice must first disclose that the chosen treatment is a deviation
from the standard of care.
B.

Ensuring Responsible Medical Practice,

Proponents of the traditional patient-protective view will argue
against expanding recognition of assumption of risk defenses beyond
alternative treatment and Jehovah's Witness cases to other instances of
unorthodox patient-directed care. Once patients are no longer permitted
to sue for injuries resulting from treatment that the medical and legal
communities consider to be outside the standard of care, critics will
argue, the deterrent effects of tort law disappear.2 61 Physicians will have
no incentive to practice according to medical norms, and patients will be
increasingly exposed to treatment methods that pose significant risks of
harm. Such an outcome would effectively render the medical and legal
concepts of "standard of care" obsolete.
It is true that limiting malpractice liability for physicians who choose
to offer patients non-standard treatments will remove an important
disincentive to negligent medical practice. However, these effects will
be limited to the intentional provision of treatment outside of the
standard of care with a patient's voluntary and informed consent. This
establishes a very clear dividing line and will not impact patients' right
261. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 90, at 257 (arguing against contractual limitations on patients'
right to sue for medical malpractice, on the grounds that the use of such contracts would defeat the
individual and systemic deterrent effects of tort law).
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to tort recovery for the kind of unanticipated negligence that forms the
basis of many medical malpractice actions, which by its very nature
patients cannot knowingly accept.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that while malpractice
liability incentivizes quality of care at both the individual and systemic
level,262 a fundamental and unique goal of tort law is to allow victims of
civil wrongs to obtain recourse against those who have caused their
injuries,"' And there is no inconsistency in holding that a patient should
not receive compensation for injuries from a non-standard treatment he
knowingly and voluntarily consented to, while also holding that a
physician who provides such treatment is violating the norms of the
medical profession (and therefore would be considered to have breached
a duty had his patient not accepted the risks of treatment). Tort law, of
course, is also driven by the desire to incentivize good behavior and
deter people from taking unreasonable risks that impact third parties.
However, this goal is not unique to the tort system-it is shared by
criminal law, administrative law, and various other societal levers for
controlling behavior. Thus, because there are many other legal and
practical mechanisms beyond the bounds of tort law that serve to
reinforce standards of care and incentivize physicians to practice within
those standards, limiting patients' ability to recover in tort when they
choose medical malpractice is unlikely to increase the market in "bad
medicine."
1.

State Licensure and Discipline

The most valuable legal mechanisms in this regard are state medical
licensure and discipline laws, which establish the requirements for
obtaining and retaining a medical license, and authorize state medical
boards to discipline physicians whose practices falls too far outside the
medical mainstream. Indeed, Dr. Emanuel Revici, the defendant in
Schneider v. Revici 264 and Boyle v. Revici, 265 lost his medical license as a
66
result of his treatment of cancer patients with alternative therapies.1
262. Id. (discussing systemic incentives provided by tort law in malpractice cases).
263. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTION TO U.S.
LAW: TORTS 6 (2010) ("Tort law empowers victims to obtain recourse against those who have
wronged them.").
264. 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987).
265. 961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992).
266. Revici v. Comm'r of Educ., 546 N.Y.S.2d 240 (App. Div. 1989) (upholding Commissioner
of Education's disciplinary action against Dr. Revici for treating breast cancer patients with vinegar,
baking soda, soft boiled eggs, and coffee); Emanuel Revici, M.D., Arb. 93-128, 1993 WL 13670584
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Countless example s have been reported in the media of disciplinary
actions against "maverick" physicians providing unorthodox treatments
sought out by patients skeptical of traditional medical practices,
including treatment of "chronic" Lyme disease with long-term antibiotic
therapy,26 7 delaying or denying routine pediatric vaccinations,268 stem
cell treatments for both anti-aging purposes and treatment of serious
disorders, 269 treatment of autistic children with chelation therapy and
271
chemical castration, 27 ° in vitro implantation of multiple embryos,
(N.Y. Dep't of Health Bd. for Prof. Med. Conduct Jan. 1, 1993) (sustaining Hearing Committee's
Determination revoking Dr. Revici's license to practice medicine in New York State).
267. Holcomb B. Noble, Lyme Doctors Rally Behind a Colleague Under Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/1l/10/us/lyme-doctors-rally-behind-a-colleagueunder-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/XF49-EGHA] (discussing controversy surrounding board
discipline of physicians treating Lyme disease); David Whelan, Lyme Inc., FORBES (Feb. 23, 2007),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0312/096.html
[https://perma.cc/863M-7WNL] (describing
medical board action against "Lyme Literate" physician Dr. Joseph Jemsek).
268. Arthur L. Caplan, Revoke the License of Any Doctor Who Opposes Vaccination, WASH.
POST (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/revoke-the-license-of-any-doctorwho-opposes-vaccinationl2015/02/06/1 la05e50-ad7f-1 1e4-9c91-e9d2f9fde644_story.html?utmt
erm=.63250c5dff31 [https://perma.cc/JJ2A-3FB6] (arguing that doctors who oppose vaccination
should have their medical licenses revoked, and that state licensing boards have the authority to do
so); Matt Hamilton, Dr. Bob Sears, Critic of Vaccine Laws, Could Lose License After Exempting
Toddler, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016, 10:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ocvaccine-doctor-20160908-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/87JA-FDQS] (describing disciplinary
action against physician for "improperly excusing a toddler from immunization" on the basis of a
parent's description of the child's response to previous vaccinations).
269. Alan Zarembo, Doctor with Revoked License Continues to Sell Unproven Stem Cell
Treatments, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2015, 5:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/califomia/la-mestem-cell-injections-20150517-story.html [https://perma.cc/PV3H-E75U] (describing disciplinary
action against physician who used stem cell injections to treat patients with arthritis, muscular
dystrophy, spinal cord injuries and other conditions).
270. Deborah Shelton, Dr. Mark Geier Loses License in Illinois, Missouri, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 5,
2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-05/news/ct-met-autism-doctor-20121106_1autism-doctor-david-geier-mark-geier [https://perma.cc/S4GU-PYV6] (describing disciplinary
action againsi physician using "dubious treatments" for autism); Trine Tsouderos & Patricia
Callahan, Risky Alternative Therapiesfor Autism Have Little Basis in Science, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 22,
2009),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/chi-autism-treatments-nov22-story.html
[https://perma.cc/T8GB-CFAX] (describing complaints to state medical boards filed by parents of
children with autism who received "alternative" therapies).
271. Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, State Medical BoardRevokes Octomom Doc 's License, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (June 2, 2011, 1:58 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-state-medicalboard-revokes-octomom-docs-license-201 ljun02-story.html
[https://perma.cc/N664-78LN]
(describing Medical Board of California's decision to revoke license of physician who implanted
twelve embryos in Nadya Suleman, the "Octomom"); Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, FDA Witness:
Octomom Doc Used ExperimentalMethods, 89.3KPCC (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.scpr.org/news/
2010/11/1 8/21094/fda-witness-octomom-doc-used-experimental-methods/ [https://perma.cc/QGW3
-9YKP] (describing evidence in state medical board hearing for Nadya Suleman's physician,
including evidence that Dr. Kamrava went "out of his way to warn Suleman of the risks of
implanting all 12 embryos," and "clearly spelled out over and over and over again that... he
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unnecessary tests and inappropriate prescribing,27 2 recommendation of
medical marijuana, 273 and aid in dying for non-terminal patients. 74
While some physicians who engage in these non-standard practices view
board discipline as a badge of honor reflecting their status as
innovators,27 5 the threat of suspension or complete revocation of one's
medical license for practicing outside the standard of care surely has a
deterrent effect even greater than that of tort liability.
2.

InsuranceReimbursement

A second mechanism that can be relied upon to address concerns
about quality of care is that of insurance reimbursement. Even if the
threat of tort liability for unorthodox treatments is gone, physicians will
not provide these treatments if they know they will not be compensated
for their services. Both governmental and private insurers already use
financial levers to drive medical practice-from utilization review of
high-cost procedures 27 6 to coverage refusals for specific conditions and

disagreed with her decision, and that she understands everything, that she's insisting he transfer all
the embryos").
272. Tara Bannow, Redmond Physician Could Lose Her License, BEND BULL. (May 30, 2015,
12:04
AM),
http://www.bendbulletin.com/newsroomstafflist/320385 1-15 1/redmond-physiciancould-lose-her-license
[https://perma.cc/R9ZC-TSCZ]
(discussing board investigation of a
physician for a 'pattern' of unnecessary tests, treatments that were not medically indicated and
prescribing excessive amounts of antibiotic and opioid medications").
273. Felice J. Freyer & Kay Lazar, Medical MariuanaDoctor Loses License to Practice, BOS.
GLOBE (June 3, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/06/03/medical-marijuana-doctorsloses-license-practice/L5jRBrby55bFWb 8p8AwB61/story.html
[https://perma.cc/M8AP-K2R6]
(describing medical board's revocation of licenses of two physicians for "improperly certifying that
thousands of patients were eligible to receive medical marijuana"); John Ingold, Four Colorado
Doctors Suspended over Medical Marijuana Recommendations, DENVER POST (July 19, 2016),
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/19/four-colorado-doctors-suspended-over-medical-marijuanarecommendations/ [https://perma.cc/R9Y4-BWLU] (describing medical board's revocation of
licenses of four physicians for recommending "excessive plant counts to more than 1,500 patients").
274. Alan Blinder, Doctor Loses License over Assisted Suicides, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/us/doctor-loses-license-over-assisted-suicides.html?-r(last
visited Apr. 30, 2018) (describing physician whose medical license was revoked for attending the
suicides of six people "suffering from intolerable medical circumstances").
275. As one physician, who spoke with pride of losing his license for treating patients with
unproven stem cell injections, said to a reporter, "I must be doing something right ....The greater
percentage of people who get into trouble are ahead of their time." Zarembo, supra note 269.
276. See Howard L. Bailit & Cary Sennett, Utilization Management as a Cost-Containment
Strategy, 1991 Supp. HEALTH CARE FtNANCING REV. 87 (1992); Kanika Kapur, Carole Roan
Gresenz & David M. Studdert, Managing Care: Utilization Review in Action at Two Capitated
Medical Groups, HEALTH AFFAIRS (2003).
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treatments. 2 7 When insurers deny coverage for non-standard treatments,
those treatments will end up being available only to patients who are
able to provide their own funding. And unless there are a substantial
number of patients both clamoring for an unconventional treatment and
willing to pay for it out of pocket, the likelihood that physicians will
continue to provide these services is low. With respect to governmental
payors, moreover, the exclusionary power of Medicare and Medicaid
pursuant to federal Conditions of Participation-frequently described as
a "death sentence" for health care providers-can be used against
physicians who do not satisfy professionally recognized standards of
care.

3.

27 8

InstitutionalStandards and HospitalCredentialing

Health care institutions can also use their powers to define the
boundaries of appropriate medical practice. Medical providers who work
as employees or contractors within hospitals, nursing homes, and other
facilities are bound by institutional policies and staff bylaws. These,
along with peer review, can be used as mechanisms for limiting
physicians' authority to operate outside the standard of care. In the case
of the Scottish physician who amputated the healthy limbs of patients
with apotemnophilia, for example, the hospital at which he performed
the surgeries ultimately "announced a ban on further amputations after a
'
report of the hospital's ethics committee."279
With consolidation in the health care industry at an all-time high, and
the trend towards pay-for-performance incentivizing institutional
management of quality and risk, health care organizations now have
even more tools to define (and enforce) standards of practice among
their providers.

277. For example, cosmetic surgery, infertility treatments, weight loss surgery, home birth,
experimental treatments, and alternative and complementary therapies are among the services that
many health insurance policies exclude from coverage. See, e.g., Limitations and Exclusions of
Aetna Health Insurance Plans, AETNA, https://www.aetna.com/plan-info/individual/legal/
limitations-exclusions.html [https://perma.cc/883T-FA4R] (identifying such exclusions in Aetna
health insurance plans).
278. See generally Exclusions Authorities, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF

HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/authorities.asp

[https://perma.cc/C5JT-

ZMNS].
279. Sabine Muller, Body Identity Integrity Disorder(BIID): Is the Amputation of Healthy Limbs
EthicallyJustfied?, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36, 36 (2009).
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Legislative Prohibitions

Finally, if the medical and legal communities believe that a given
approach to treatment is so extreme that it is unavoidably harmful,
fundamentally inconsistent with professional norms, and lacks any
societal value, state legislators could enact laws banning the treatment.
State laws prohibiting the use of sexual orientation conversion therapy
on minors are one example of legislative intervention aimed at
protecting patients from a treatment that has been generally rejected by
the medical community. 8 ° Laws criminalizing assistance in suicide,
while not aimed at health care professionals specifically, serve a similar
purpose."' That said, legislative intervention is a less preferable solution
than medical board discipline, financial disincentives, or institutional
enforcement of standards of care, as such laws are frequently driven by
political motivations rather than scientific evidence or medical norms. 82
In sum, there are many ways in which the medical profession can
signal to physicians what constitutes appropriate medical practice, and
there are many legal and institutional deterrents to inappropriate
practice. Limiting patients' right to tort recovery when they provide
voluntary and informed consent to treatment that intentionally falls
outside the standard of care is not likely to dramatically lower the bar of
physician practice. Today, outlier physicians providing treatments
widely rejected by the medical and scientific communities do so despite
public censure, license revocation, tort litigation, and even criminal
charges. They do so in spite of these significant risks because patients,
disillusioned with traditional medical practice, continue to seek them
out. Clearly, these physicians are not deterred by the threat of
malpractice liability, and elimination of that single deterrent is not likely
to change their practice patterns.
280. See Haldeman, supra note 66, at 117; Shidlo & Schroeder, supra note 66, at 249.
281. See, e.g., Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. 2012) (holding GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-5(b) (1994) to be an unconstitutional restriction of speech); State v. Melchert-Dinkel,
844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014) (holding the State could prosecute an individual for assisting another
in committing suicide, but not for encouraging or advising another to commit suicide); State v. Final
Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (upholding statutory prohibition on
assisting suicide).
282. Laws restricting access to abortion are a good example. While the medical community
accepts late-term abortions and partial-birth abortions as being within the standard of care and
sometimes a matter of medical necessity, legislatures have overridden the opinions of medical
experts on the basis of dubious evidence. See Margo Kaplan, A Special Class of Persons: Pregnant
Women's Right to Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145,
158 (2011) (discussing "flimsy" evidentiary grounds for legislative finding that partial birth
abortion is never medically necessary).
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In contrast, some physicians may be limiting their use of innovative
treatments that are safe and effective, but not yet widely accepted by the
profession, simply because they fear being sued by litigious patients who
don't achieve the results they hope for. The practice of defensive
medicine has been widely documented,28 3 and it can encompass not just
providing unnecessary tests and treatments, but also not providing
treatments that a jury might find do not comport with professional
custom. Malpractice law's reliance on custom to define the standard of
care means that highly beneficial advances in medicine-including those
that have greater evidentiary support than standard practices-tend to be
adopted more slowly than they should be.284 If physicians had the
confidence that a patient's informed agreement to pursue innovative
treatment would free physicians from liability for proper performance of
that treatment, perhaps much-needed medical innovations would be
adopted sooner, rather than later, benefiting patients overall. Thus, if
courts expanded the use of these defenses to other contexts, physicians
would have the flexibility to modify their practice in accordance with the
best evidence without fear of liability.
CONCLUSION
Courts' willingness to accept defenses to medical malpractice
grounded in a patient's explicit or implicit assumption of risk in two
narrow contexts-experimental and alternative treatments, and
Jehovah's Witness blood refusal-demonstrates that the traditional

283. See Daniel Kessler & Mark McLellan, Do Doctors PracticeDefensive Medicine?, 111 Q. J.
EcoN. 353 (1996) (finding that malpractice reforms that reduce the pressure of litigation also reduce
medical expenditures without substantial effects on morbidity or mortality); David M. Studdert et
al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice
Environment, 293 JAMA 2609 (2005) (finding that 93% of surveyed physicians in high-risk
specialties reported practicing defensive medicine, including using imaging technology when not
medically necessary); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-H-602, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1994) (describing defensive medicine practices and their prevalence).
284. See Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S.
Healthcare System, 37 AM. J. L. MED. 7, 14-16 (2011) (arguing that the common law system of
medical malpractice liability does not keep pace with developments in medical innovation); Michael
D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive Standard of Care, 19
HEALTH MATRIX 423 (2009) (arguing that the liability risks associated with the use of new medical
devices operate as a disincentive to quality improvement and technical innovation); Laakmann,
supra note 8 (arguing that the risk of malpractice liability deters physicians from deviating from
generally accepted medical practices in an attempt to improve patient care); Daniel Merenstein,
Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15 (2004) (describing a lawsuit by a patient who claimed that his
physician, who followed national guidelines regarding shared decision-making for PSA testing,
violated the standard of care of PSA testing without patient discussion).
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patient-protective view set forth in cases like Tunkl is not without
exception. In some contexts, patients are permitted to waive their health
care providers' duty to exercise due care, even though patients are
traditionally viewed as vulnerable in the face of providers' superior
knowledge and bargaining power.
This Article demonstrates that courts would be similarly justified in
accepting these defenses in other contexts where patients seek out
treatment that satisfies their personal preferences, despite the fact that it
potentially falls outside the standard of care. The precedent set in the
experimental treatment and blood refusal cases could be extended to
many cases of "malpractice. by choice," as long as the patient
understands the risks and benefits of the selected treatment and its
alternatives, the patient is ultimately injured by risks inherent in the
treatment rather than by unanticipated negligence, and the legal
factfinder views the treatment as offering some societal value.
Effectively, a patient's informed consent to unorthodox treatment would
operate as a defense to a medical malpractice action.
But, this Article cautions, there are risks in formalistically applying
the doctrines of assumption of risk and contractual waiver of liability to
the physician-patient encounter. Neither doctrine demands that a
physician satisfy the disclosure obligations imposed by the common law
of informed consent (including the duty to disclose his own conflicts of
interest), nor that he disclose the fact that the treatment he is offering
deviates from the medical profession's standard of care. As a matter of
policy, however, it makes sense to require physicians who wish to
benefit from defenses based on a patient's voluntary acceptance of risk
to demonstrate that they have made these disclosures. The fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship demands these additional
patient protections.
Such an approach would benefit patients who believe that unorthodox
treatment is more consistent with their values and preferences and
pursue it with full knowledge of its comparative risks and benefits. It
would likewise benefit physicians by protecting them from liability
when they offer alternative treatments sought out by patients, so long as
they satisfy their legal obligation to secure the patient's informed
consent and disclose the fact that they are operating outside the standard
of care. It might facilitate beneficial innovation in the delivery of
medical care that is otherwise stymied by malpractice liability rules that
defer to customary standards and view patients as incapable of making
informed decisions to pursue treatment that deviates from those
standards. And it would certainly be more in line with modern views of
patient autonomy in medical decision-making. If the common law of
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informed consent is justified on the basis of patients' ability to
understand and thoughtfully consider the risks and benefits of various
types of medical treatment, then binding them to the consequences of
their decisions is a natural extension of that principle.

